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I.

INTRODUCTION

In a controversial recent decision, a hearing commissioner with the
Massachusetts anti-discrimination agency sanctioned a female domestic
relations lawyer under state public accommodations law for declining to
represent a male party in ongoing divorce proceedings. The purpose of
this Article is to evaluate the competing claims of the lawyer to freedom
of association in choosing clients, and the potential client to equal access
to legal services without regard to his gender. Which claim ought to be
preferred in this context? Following this Introduction, the second part
of this Article takes a more detailed look at the facts and circumstances
surrounding the dispute between Joseph Stropnicky and Attorney Judith
Nathanson, as well as the grounds for decision articulated by the hearing
commissioner. 1
The next part of the Article attempts to establish a framework for
evaluating the competing claims in Stropnicky and Nathanson's case. 2

* B.A. Franklin and Marshall College 1985, J.D. Harvard Law School 1989,
L.L.M. Harvard Law School 1998. The Author will be joining the faculty of Nova
Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center as an Assistant Professor in the fall
1998 term. Special thanks to Martha Min ow, Todd Rak off and Deanna Sampson for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
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It begins by reviewing the framework established by the Supreme Court
for balancing claims of freedom of association against competing claims
of equal access to some public good under public accommodation or
other anti-discrimination legislation. 3 Pursuant to the Court's framework, particular associations are determined to fall within one of three
categories. Associations falling within the first category, described as
intimate or personal associations, or the second category, described as
expressive associations, are granted heightened constitutional protection
by the Court. Thus, claims of freedom of association by the members
of such associations are likely to be preferred to competing claims of
equal access raised by non-members. With regard to associations falling
within the Court's third category, however, no such heightened
constitutional protection is afforded, and claims to equal access by those
excluded from such associations are likely to be preferred to competing
claims of freedom of association.
The next part of this Article argues that the Supreme Court's
framework is an inadequate evaluation of the competing claims presented
by Stropnicky and Nathanson.4 The Court's framework fails to provide
sufficient recognition to the importance of political activity to our
constitutional scheme. Yet it is precisely the political nature of
Nathanson's gender-conscious client selection policy that provides what
is compelling about her claim to freedom of association in this matter.
In an effort to compensate for what is lacking in the Supreme Court's
framework, Part III goes on to explore parallels between the Court's
three categories of associations and the three spheres of human activity
referred to in the writings of philosopher Hannah Arendt, the private,
social, and public realms,5 and discusses how Arendt might have
resolved conflicts between the freedom of association and equality
principles within each of her three spheres. 6 It then reviews critiques
that have been made of Arendt's three spheres. 7 Finally, in light of the
Supreme Court and Arendt's formulations and the aforementioned
critiques of both, Part III proposes a reconstructed framework for
evaluating competing claims of freedom of association and equal access,
based on the modified categories of private, social/commercial, and
political associations. 8 Within the first of these categories, the freedom
of association principle will presumptively be preferred to the equality
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principle, whereas, in the second, the opposite will be the case, With
regard to the category of political associations, a "hard look" type of
review of the competing claims will be necessary,
Part IV of this Article focuses on the question of whether Nathanson's
law practice, in which only women are represented in divorce cases,
should be considered to be a private, commercial, or political association
for purposes of Part Ill's reconstructed framework, After rejecting
categorization of the law practice as a private association, 9 the essay
considers the commercial nature of the practice of law. 10 While the
economic considerations involved in the practice of law are obvious, the
current dominant conception of lawyering, referred to here as the
professional model, formally treats such financial considerations as being
merely incidental to legal practice. This tenet of the professional model
has been under attack in recent years, and its viability is questionable.
Nonetheless, Nathanson's refusal to represent Stropnicky does not appear
to have been motivated primarily by commercial considerations, and
therefore, the association formed with the clients Nathanson has chosen
to represent need not necessarily be categorized as a commercial
association.
In considering whether Nathanson's law practice ought to be
categorized as a political association, Part IV.C. begins by looking at
legal practice from the perspectfve of the professional model. 11 The
essay concludes that neither the professional model's strong primacy of
client interests tenet, 12 nor its weaker "protect the public good" tenet, 13
provides for a conception of lawyering that would place Nathanson's law
practice within Part Ill's category of political associations. Part IV,
however, goes on to describe an alternative perspective to that of the
professional model from which Nathanson's law practice may be viewed,
that of the public interest lawyering model. 14 While the traditional
view of public interest lawyering does provide for a conception of legal
practice that would place such a practice within Part Ill's political
association category, 15 attacks on the public interest lawyering model
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from sources including congress and the courts, as well as a cntJque
raised by poverty law scholars, call into question the model's continuing
viability. 16 Nonetheless, Part IV concludes that, if modified, a viable
conception of public interest lawyering survives, 17 and that Nathanson's
law practice fits one prototype of what public interest lawyering needs
to become in the future. 18 As such, her law practice warrants the
heightened protection afforded to political associations in Part Ill's
framework.
Finally, in light of Part IV's conclusion, Part V attempts to balance
Stropnicky's equality claim against Nathanson's freedom of association
claim. The essay argues that to the extent that Stropnicky's claim
presents a familiar argument based on gender "neutrality," it ought to be
rejected in favor of Nathanson's competing claim. However, to the
extent that Stropnicky's claim is based on a positional analysis of his
subordinated status as a "homemaker," it is entitled to greater weight.
Similarly, the essay argues that Nathanson's decision to refuse to
represent Stropnicky is entitled to less weight as an example of a
traditional "benign discrimination" type preference for the members of
a traditionally disadvantaged group, than as an exercise in judgment (in
the Arendtian sense) that the cause of gender equality would be better
served by such a decision. The essay concludes that a proper balance
between the competing claims requires a particularized analysis of the
facts and circumstances effecting gender issues in the courts today.
II.

THE CASE: STROPNICKY V. NATHANSON 19

In the summer of 1991, Joseph Stropnicky sought the assistance of a
lawyer to review a draft divorce settlement agreement prepared in
conjunction with the termination of Stropnicky's eighteen-year marriage.
Stropnicky's position in relation to the divorce settlement was somewhat
atypical, as he had been a "househusband" for much of the marriage's

16. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
I 7. See infra Part IV.C.2.c.
I 8. See infra Part IV.C.3.
19.
The following account is drawn from the February 25, 1997, written decision
of a single Commissioner (Charles A. Walker, Jr.) of the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination in the case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, which is published at I 9
MASS. DJSCRIM. L. REP. 39 (1997) [hereinafter "M.D.L.R."], and from two newspaper
articles regarding the case which appeared in the legal newspaper Massachusetts
Lawyers· Weekly [hereinafter "MASS. LAW. WKLY."]: Barbara Rabinowitz, Client
Selection, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 19, 1993, at B29; Mark A. Cohen, Refusal to
Represent Husband is Gender Bias: MCAD Rules Against "Wives Only" Lawyer, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Mar. 3, 1997, at Al.
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duration. 2° For seven years following the birth of the couple's first
child, Stropnicky stayed at home and cared for the couple's children
while his wife pursued a career as a doctor. After the couple's second
child turned three, Stropnicky obtained a certificate to teach biology.
However, he worked only intermittently throughout the rest of the
marriage due to tight education budgets during that period. 21 At the
time of the divorce, Stropnicky's annual earnings were approximately
one tenth of those of his wife.
The divorce mediator who helped the couple prepare its draft
settlement agreement suggested that each of the parties retain counsel to
review the draft agreement. 22 To assist the parties in finding counsel,
the mediator provided a list of recommended family law practitioners.
20. Figures from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics for the year 1991,
cited in an influential law review article, found that only 415,000 men stayed out of the
work force that year to "keep house," whereas approximately 24 million women did so.
See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REY.
67, 69 n.3 (1993) (arguing that the plight of displaced homemakers would be eased by
reconfiguring laws regarding marriage and divorce along the lines of contemporary
partnership law). For a more recent article dealing with our legal system's under
appreciation of the value of homework, see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into
Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1996). For a wide-ranging
discussion of related issues including the valuation of homework and the position of
parties following divorce, see Symposium: Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2119 (1994).
21. In November 1980, Massachusetts voters approved a ballot initiative commonly
referred to as Proposition 2½. Modeled on California's Proposition 13, the Massachusetts initiative limited the annual property assessments of most cities and towns to 2\/,
percent of the property's fair cash value. See generally Massachusetts Teachers Assoc.
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 424 N.E.2d 469, 472 n.4 (1981) (upholding law
resulting from ballot initiative against a variety of challenges). As a result of Proposition
2 ½'s enactment, municipalities faced a period of fiscal scarcity, with education budgets
bearing the brunt of the necessary reductions. See, e.g., The Impact of Proposition 2½
on the Public Schools: A REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL
COMMITTEES ( 1982); Proposition 2½: Its Impact on Massachusetts: A REPORT FROM THE
IMPACT: 2 ½ PROJECT AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (Lawrence
E. Suskind & Jane Fountain Serio eds., 1983).
22. Representation of both parties to divorce proceedings is generally considered
to involve the lawyer in representing conflicting interests. See, e.g., D.E. Evins,
Annotation, What Constitutes Representation of Conflicting Interests Subjecting Attorney
to Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R. 3rd 835, § 7 (1968). For more recent analyses
questioning, to some degree, this traditional view, see, e.g., Teresa S. Collett, And the
Two Shall Become as One . .. Until the Lawver.,· are Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y l01 (1993); Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics:
Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253
(1994).
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One of the lawyers on the list whom Stropnicky sought assistance from
was Judith Nathanson, 23 one of three partners in a small law firm in
Lawrence, Massachusetts. 24 The mediator described Nathanson to
Stropnicky as a lawyer who deals aggressively with issues of concern to
wives in divorce matters. In seeking Nathanson's assistance, Stropnicky
hoped to benefit from Nathanson's expertise in representing wives, given
the similarity of his circumstances to many "housewives."
In addition to representing wives in divorce proceedings, Nathanson
represents both women and men in a variety of probate-related and other
types of proceedings. Nathanson's firm solicits clients through a variety
of common means including listings in the yellow and white pages,
advertisements in local newspapers, and a sign outside of its office.
Attorney Nathanson is also listed with the referral services of a variety
of advocacy groups including the Women's Resource Center of Greater
Lawrence, the National Center for Women in Family Law, and
Merrimack Valley Legal Services.
Nathanson "is committed to developing the domestic relations law ...
in ways that promote and advance the interests of wives." 25 She
represents women exclusively in divorce proceedings so that she can
devote her expertise to combating gender bias in the Massachusetts court
system. Ms. Nathanson states that she needs to feel a personal
commitment to her client in order to be an effective representative, and
that she only feels such a commitment with regard to wives in divorce
proceedings. Ms. Nathanson further believes that the exclusive nature
of her divorce practice causes her clients to have greater trust in her and
a greater willingness to share personal and confidential information with
her than would otherwise be the case. She also believes that her
exclusive practice has allowed her to maintain a consistency in her legal
arguments that has enhanced her credibility with the judges she appears
before in probate court.

23. Stropnicky also contacted other lawyers on the list in an effort to retain
counsel. The other lawyers contacted declined to represent Stropnicky for reasons that
are not clear.
24. Lawrence, Massachusetts is a post-industrial city which lies approximately 26
miles north of Boston, and currently has the lowest per capita income of any of
Massachusetts' 351 cities and towns. See MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: COMMUNITY PROFILES (1997). Lawrence was one of
the early centers of the textile industry in America and was the site of a good deal of
labor organizational activity by the largely female textile workers, including the famous
"Bread and Roses" strike of 1912. See generally ARDIS CAMERON, RADICALS OF THE
WORST SORT: LABORING WOMEN IN LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS, I 860-1912 (1993).
25. Rabinowitz, supra note 19, at B29 (quoting respondent's pleading before the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination).
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When Stropnicky contacted Nathanson's office seeking representation,
the receptionist informed him that Nathanson does not represent men in
divorce cases.
However, Stropnicky insisted on speaking with
Nathanson personally. The next day, Nathanson returned Stropnicky's
call and reiterated her policy of representing women exclusively in
divorce proceedings. She declined to make an exception in Stropnicky's
case despite his explanation that his circumstances were similar to those
of many women in divorce proceedings and the fact that the arguments
that would be advanced on his behalf would be similar to those
advanced on behalf of many of Nathanson's female clients.
Shortly thereafter, Stropnicky filed a complaint against Nathanson with
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (M.C.A.D. or
Commission) alleging illegal gender discrimination. Stropnicky stated
in his complaint that he felt angry, humiliated and defeated by
Nathanson's refusal to represent him on grounds of his gender. He
further stated that as a result of his negative experience dealing with
Nathanson, he did not make additional efforts to secure the assistance of
counsel with regard to his divorce settlement agreement and subsequently regretted going forward with his divorce proceedings without the
assistance of counsel.
Following a hearing held on January 26, 1996, a single M.C.A.D.
Commissioner26 ruled in favor of Stropnicky in a thoughtful, written
decision, 27 issued on February 25, 1997. 28 The Commissioner found
that Nathanson's refusal to represent Stropnicky solely on grounds of his
gender amounted to a denial of equal treatment in a place of public

26. Pursuant to the relevant statutes and M.C.A.D. rules, a single Commissioner,
acting as hearing officer, initially hears and adjudicates complaints filed with the
Commission. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 3(6), 5 (1994); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
804, § 1.15(5) (1996). A subsequent appeal is provided to the full Commission. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 3(6), 5; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 804, § 1.16 (1996).
27. See 19 M.D.L.R. at 39.
28. Stropnicky's complaint was originally filed on July 24, 1991. The matter was
scheduled for a public hearing on September 16, 1992, following a finding of probable
cause by the Investigating Commissioner the previous month (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
151B, §§ 3(6), 5; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 804, § 1.08 (1996)). Delays similar to the
nearly six years between filing and initial decision in Stropnicky's case have plagued
complainants before the Commission. See Lynn A. Girton, Pursuing Claims at the
M.C.A.D., 75 MASS. L. REV. 152, 164 (1990). In its 1996 annual report, the M.C.A.D.
stated that more than 5,000 new complaints had been filed with it that year, while more
than 8,000 complaints remained pending at the end of the year. MASSACHUSETTS
COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION-ANNUAL REPORT (1996).
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accommodation based on prohibited grounds, in violation of the
Massachusetts public accommodations law. 29 In finding Nathanson's
law office to be a place of public accommodation, the Commissioner
relied upon judicial decisions interpreting the statute's coverage broadly
and inclusively, 30 as well as the Commission's own decisions applying
the statute's coverage to the offices of other professionals such as
doctors and dentists. 31 In addition, the Commissioner looked to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which expressly defines a law
office to be a place of public accommodation, 32 and concluded that it
would be inconsistent with the Massachusetts statute's broad remedial
purposes for it to be construed more narrowly than the ADA. 33
The Commissioner took pains to point out that he did not "intend to
undermine those professional considerations attorneys traditionally rely
upon in making business decisions." 34 In particular, he mentioned an
attorney's ability to decline representation in areas where the attorney
lacks sufficient expertise to handle the case adequately. 35 Thus,
according to the Commissioner, while an attorney retains the right to
decline representation on a variety of grounds, she may not do so solely
on the basis of the potential client's membership in a protected class. 36
The Commissioner also pointed out that the scope of his authority was

29. The Massachusetts public accommodations law, provides, in relevant part, that
it is unlawful to make "any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of ...
sex ... relative to the admission of any person to, or his treatment in any place of
public accommodation, resort or amusement." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1994).
The statute goes on to define a "place of public accommodation" as "any place ...
which is open to and accepts or solicits patronage of the general public[,]" and provides
a non-exclusive list of examples of public accommodations, including a "retail store or
establishment, including those dispensing personal services." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 92A (1994). With regard to the "venerable history" of the Massachusetts public
accommodations law (which was the first of its kind passed following the Civil War),
see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
( 1995). For a thorough review of the history of such public accommodation provisions,
see Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
30. 19 M.D.L.R. at 40 (citing Concord Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Comm. Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 1364 (1988) (hunting and fishing club is a
place of public accommodation) and Local Fin. Co. of Rockland v. Massachusetts
Comm. Against Discrimination, 242 N.E.2d 536, 539 (1968) (the office of a finance
company in the business of making loans is a place of public accommodation).
31. 19 M.D.L.R. at 40.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (1996).
33. 19 M.D.L.R. at 40.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-IOl(A)(l)
(1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1996).
36. 19 M.D.L.R. at 41. The statute prohibits discrimination on grounds of "race,
color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation ... deafness, blindness or
any physical or mental disability or ancestry." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98.
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limited to analysis of Stropnicky's claims under the public accommodations law and the M.C.A.D.'s procedural statutes. 37 Thus, he declined
to address Nathanson's argument that application of the public accommodations law to her practice would violate her First Amendment rights,
noting that consideration of such arguments would have to be left to any
reviewing courts. 38
As punishment for her statutory violation, the Commissioner ordered
Nathanson to pay a $5,000 fine. 39 Nathanson has appealed the decision
to the full three-member Commission. 4°
Following the full
Commission's decision, either party (or both) may seek judicial review
of the Commission's decision. 41 Such review is limited to the question
of whether the Commission committed an error of law or otherwise
abused its discretion. 42
Not surprisingly, the Commissioner's decision has provoked a great
deal of controversy among lawyers in Massachusetts. Letters to the
editor of Massachusetts' leading legal newspaper, Lawyers' Weekly, have
illustrated the range of views. Some lawyers have expressed outrage 43
at the Commission's intrusion into what has traditionally been considered
a lawyer's unfettered discretion to choose who to accept as a client. 44
Other lawyers expressed dismay that Nathanson's efforts to combat welldocumented examples of gender bias in Massachusetts' courts were not
supported by the Commission. 45 A prominent Boston law professor
characterized the decision as "legally correct," but expressed reservations
that the decision might contribute to the current backlash against
affirmative action (by treating a white male's claim of discrimination as
equivalent to discrimination claims made by members of historically
oppressed groups such as women and persons of color) and that the

37. 19 M.D.L.R. at 42.
38. Id. See infra Part III.
39. 19 M.D.L.R. at 42.
40. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5.
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 6.
42. Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (1994); Wheelock College v.
Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976).
43. See Kevin J. Mahoney, How Can MCAD Decision Comport With Cannon 7,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., March 17, 1997, at AIO; Richard J. Cohen, Ruling in Discrimination Case "Must Be Opposed," MASS. LAW, WKLY., Apr. 14, 1997, at Al0.
44. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
45. James S. Weliky et al., Discussion on MCAD Case "Misses the Point," MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Mar. 27, 1997, at AIO.
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decision might dissuade attorneys such as Nathanson from gearing their
practices toward representing historically disadvantaged groups.46 It
thus seems clear that the controversy surrounding Stropnicky v.
Nathanson is unlikely to die down anytime soon.
III.

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR BALANCING FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION AND EQUAL ACCESS CLAIMS

A.

The Supreme Court's Framework

Assuming that the full M.C.A.D. will affirm the decision of its single
Commissioner, and further assuming that any reviewing courts in
Massachusetts will uphold the determination that Nathanson's refusal to
accept Stropnicky as a client amounted to a violation of the Massachusetts public accommodation law, 47 the Massachusetts' courts, and
perhaps even the United States Supreme Court, will be faced with an
instance of the by-now familiar clash between a person or persons'
asserted right of freedom of association and another person or persons'
claimed right of equal access to some public good, without regard to (in
this case) gender. 48 This conflict is particularly vexing, because, in the
words of Professor William Marshall, it implicates "the two virtual first
principles of contemporary constitutional law: freedom and equality.
The right to choose one's associates (freedom) is pitted against the right
to equal treatment (equality), a most fundamental conflict." 49
In a trilogy of cases from the 1980s presenting conflicts between
claims of freedom of association and asserted rights of equal access to

46. Robert V. Ward, Jr.. "Painful" Discrimination Ruling is Legally Sound, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Mar. 17, 1997, at AIO.
47. This seems like a fairly safe assumption in light of the Supreme Judicial
Court's previous interpretations of the scope of the law's coverage. See supra note 30.
See also Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston,
636 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (1994) (finding Boston's St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day
Parade to be a place of public accommodation for purposes of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
272, §§ 92A, 98), rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds, Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (Supreme Judicial Court's
interpretation of public accommodations law requiring parade organizers to allow
respondent group to participate in parade had the effect of infringing upon organizers'
First Amendment free speech right to control the expressive content of the parade).
48. See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates:
A Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of the Supreme Court's Dilemma, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 143 ( 1987); Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United
States Jaycees. 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878 (1984); William P. Marshall, Discrimination and
the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68 (1986).
49. Marshall, supra note 48, at 69.
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public accommodations, 50 the United States Supreme Court established
a relatively well-defined framework for analyzing such conflicts. The
Court has divided the universe of possible associations into three
categories, and has afforded heightened constitutional protection to
associations falling within two of those categories. The first category
granted heightened constitutional protection includes intimate and/or
highly personal associations. 51 Intimate associations include relationships that "presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one's life.' " 52 In Board of Directors
of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court gave
examples of the types of associations that it had previously placed within
this category, including marriages,°' groups of relatives living together, 54 and relationships surrounding the bearing and begetting of
children, 55 and the raising and educating of children. 56 However, it is
quite clear that these kinds of intimate relationships are not at issue in
Stropnicky.
Nonetheless, the Court stated that it will not limit inclusion in its first
category of protected associations to family relationships. 57 In the case
of non-intimate associations, courts will determine whether a particular
association is sufficiently personal to warrant heightened protection with
reference to factors such as "relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." 58 Thus,

50. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. I (1988)
(upholding application of New York City Human Rights Law to prohibit private clubs'
policy of denying membership to women); Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding application of California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act to prohibit Rotary Clubs' policy against allowing women
members); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding application
of Minnesota's public accommodations law to prohibit Jaycees' policy against allowing
women members).
51. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 544; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
52. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20).
53. Id. at 545 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (I 978)).
54. Id. at 545 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
55. Id. at 545 (citing Carey v. Population Services Int'!, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
56. Id. at 545 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
57. Rotan Club, 481 U.S. at 546.
58. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
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with regard to the Jaycees, the Court found the group to be too large and
unselective in its membership to constitute a protected "personal"
association. 59 The Court reached similar conclusions with regard to the
Rotary Clubs 60 and the dining club members of the New York State
Club Association. 61
The second category of associations to which the Court has granted
heightened protection includes certain types of associations, where
persons join together for purposes of engaging in activities protected by
the First Amendment such as speech, assembly, petition for the redress
of grievances, and the exercise of religion. 62 Examples that the Court
has given of associations falling within this category include: an
NAACP-organized consumer boycott; 63 certain religious organizations;64 an ACLU-sponsored group effort toward meaningful access to
the courts; 65 and unions engaged in collective bargaining activity. 66
Accordingly, with regard to this second category of associations
receiving heightened protection, the Court in Roberts found that a "not
insubstantial part" of the Jaycees' activities constituted "protected
expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs." 67 The
Court noted that over the years, the organization had "taken public
positions on a number of diverse issues," 68 and that its members
regularly engaged in "a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising,
and other activities worthy of protection under the First Amendment .
69
• • •"
Thus, the Court concluded that the Jaycees were an "expressive" association entitled to heightened constitutional protection. By
way of contrast, the Court in Rotary Club found that unlike the Jaycees,

59. See id. at 621. Later in its opinion, the Court seemed to suggest that the
Kiwanis Club, whose membership policies it regarded to be significantly more selective
than those of the Jaycees, might fall into its category of protected personal associations.
Id. at 630. However, the Court later backed off from such a suggestion in Rotary Club.
481 U.S. at 547 n.6.
60. In addition to their size, the Court noted the high turnover of members and the
presence of strangers during most club activities as factors preventing the local Rotary
clubs from falling within the first category of associations receiving heightened
constitutional protection. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546-47.
61. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988).
62. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
63. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982)).
64. Id. (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (I 982)).
65. Id. (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)).
66. Id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
67. Id. at 626 (quoting Court of Appeals decision at 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir.
1983)).
68. Id. (citing 709 F.2d at 1569-70).
69. Id. at 627.
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the Rotary Clubs do not engage in expressive activities. 70 In fact, the
Court found that Rotary Club policy forbids the Clubs from taking
"positions on 'public questions' including political or international
issues." 71 Similarly, in New York State Club Association, the Court
found that the Association's dining club members lacked the characteristics of protected expressive associations. 72
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in Roberts concurring in
part and concurring in the Court's judgment upholding the application
of Minnesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees. 73 Justice
O'Connor did not join the Court's finding that the Jaycees are an
"expressive" association entitled to heightened constitutional protection.74 In Justice O'Connor's view, an organization must be "predominantly engaged in protected expression" in order to be entitled to the
heightened constitutional protection afforded expressive associations. 75
However, in Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Jaycees' commercial
activities predominate over its expressive ones, thereby excluding it from
the category of protected associations. 76
The Court noted in its opinion in Roberts that its willingness to afford
heightened protection to the two categories of associations described
above derives from fundamental constitutional values. With regard to
intimate/personal associations, the Court articulated its recognition that
"to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State."77 In
the case of expressive associations, the Court stated that "[a]n
individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 78

70. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'! v, Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548
(1987).
71. Id.
72. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
73. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
74. Id. at 632.
75. Id. at 635.
76. Id. at 640.
77. ld.at618.
78. Id. at 622.
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Despite the importance of the intimate/personal and expressive
associations to fundamental constitutional values, the Court's framework
does not absolutely protect such associations from any restrictions by
legislative authorities whatsoever. Rather, the Court reviews such
restrictions applying the type of "heightened scrutiny" that is familiar
from a variety of types of cases including equal protection challenges to
racial classifications, 79 and restrictions on speech that is protected by
the First Amendment. 80 In such circumstances, legislative restrictions
"may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests ... that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 81
For example. in Roberts, despite its finding that the Jaycees were an
expressive association deserving of heightened constitutional protection,
the Court went on to find that the State of Minnesota had a compelling
interest in enforcing its public accommodations law so as to eliminate
discrimination and to assure "its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services." 82 The Court ruled that this
antidiscrimination interest outweighed the infringement of the Jaycee
members' associational rights. The Court also concluded that the
Minnesota statute abridged no more associational freedom than was
necessary to accomplishing the State's goal of assuring women access
to social, political and economic equality. 83
The Court's establishment of two categories of associations that are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection leaves behind a broad
third category of "other" associations that are neither "personal" enough,
nor "expressive" enough to fall into the two previously-discussed
categories. Indeed, the Court's decisions can be seen as setting up a
continuum, with the most "private" of associations at one end (intimate/personal associations). and the most "public" of associations

79. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 475 U.S. 432, 44041 (1985); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); D. Don Welch, Legitimate
Government Purposes and State Enj,1rcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 73
n.25.
80.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-2
(1986); C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military
and Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CINN. L. REV. 779, 780 & n.6 (1988).
81. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
82.
Id. at 624.
83. Id. at 628-29. For example, the Court concluded that the Jaycees' "ability to
engage in [First Amendment l protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views"'
would not be hindered by a requirement to admit women as members. Id. at 627. The
Court rejected the argument that the views of women on public issues were likely to
differ from those of the Jaycees' male members, as "sexual stereotyping" of the worst
sort. Id. at 628.
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(expressive associations) at the other. 84 While associations falling at
the ends of the continuum receive heightened constitutional protection,
those falling within the middle do not. In such associations, "commercial,"85 "social," 86 or other such considerations predominate over
personal and/or expressive ones. 87 Because such commercial and social
considerations are not afforded as high value in our constitutional
scheme as the intimate/personal or expressive considerations that
predominate in associations that fall within the Court's other two
categories of associations, the Court applies its traditional low-level of
scrutiny 88 to regulations that may infringe on freedom of association in
such settings in the name of equal access. Thus, with regard to the
Rotary Clubs and the private New York City dining clubs, both of which
the Court found to fall within this third category of associations, the
Court had little difficulty upholding the challenged applications of public
accommodation laws. 89
B.

A Critique of the Supreme Court's Framework

A number of commentators have offered critiques of the framework
established in Roberts and its progeny. 90 The most consistent thread
running through these critiques seems to be taking off from De
Toqueville's celebration of America's multitude of small-scale, informal

84. See Failinger, supra note 48, at 148-49.
85. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
86. See, e.g., Concord Rod & Gun Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 1364, 1364 (1988).
87. Failinger, supra note 48, at 149.
88. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 475 U.S. 432, 44041 (1985); Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Welch, supra note 79,
at 73.
89. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,537
(1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. I, 1 (1988).
90. See Failinger, supra note 48; Linder, supra note 48; Marshall, supra note 48;
Deborah Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1986); Aviam
Soifer, Toward a Generalized Notion of the Right to Form or Join Associations: An
Essay for Tom Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 641 ( 1988); Kimberly S. McGovern,
Note, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Prying Open the
Doors of the All-Male Club, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1988); Note, State Power
and Discrimination by Private Clubs: First Amendment Protection for Nonexpressive
Associations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1991) [hereinafter "State Power"!.
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associations, 91 that the Court's framework fails to protect adequately the
contribution to pluralism and cultural diversity made by such associations by declining to extend heightened constitutional protection to a
broad enough range of such associations. 92 However, few would argue
that all such associations contribute equally to the advancement of
fundamental constitutional values. Therefore, it seems to me, particularly in light of the genuine harm that such groups can cause by their
exclusionary practices, 93 that the Court is on solid ground in trying to
distinguish among such groups in terms of the degree to which they
serve the fundamental constitutional values. In fact, my basic criticism
of the Court's framework is that it does not go far enough in requiring
a close fit between the associations to which it will grant heightened
constitutional protection and the fundamental constitutional values that
underlie its framework.
For example, it appears that the Court's framework is faulty in the
extent to which it affords heightened protection to certain "personal," but
not "intimate" associations. 94 Aside from the fact that granting such
heightened protection in contexts beyond marriages, families, procreation, contraception, education and child rearing went beyond any
existing precedents,95 as pointed out by Professor Marshall, such smallscale groups, which may include anything from a bridge club to a
country club, simply fail to advance the constitutional values that are
implicated by intimate associations to a degree that is sufficient to
outweigh the harm caused by exclusionary practices by such groups. 96
As I will argue more fully below, 97 genuinely intimate relationships are
foundational to development of the kind individual identity that is
indispensable to our scheme of self-government. By contrast, informal
groups such as a bridge club simply fail to serve that end in a manner
that is deserving of heightened constitutional protection. While such a
criticism may seem to be beside the point in the present context, given
that a law practice seems an unlikely candidate for categorization as a

91. See Linder, supra note 48, at 1901; State Power, supra note 90, at 1838.
92. See Linder, supra note 48, at 1901-03; Marshall, supra note 48, at 104-05;
State Power, supra note 90, at 1850-51.
93. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 90; McGovern, supra note 90.
94. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
95. See Marshall, supra note 48, at 80.
96. Id. at 81. Marshall relies on Kenneth Karst's identification of society (the
enjoyment of certain other people), care and commitment, intimacy (physical and
emotional) and self-identification (seeing oneself through the eyes of those with whom
one is intimate), as the fundamental values served by intimate associations. See Kenneth
Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629-39 (1980).
97. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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personal associat10n for purposes of the Court's framework, 98 such a
criticism is important to developing a comprehensive framework for
addressing conflicts between claims of freedom of association and claims
of equality,
The Supreme Court's framework also seems to be overinclusive at the
"public" end of its continuum of associations, A framework that equates
the Jaycees with groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU in terms of
their importance to fundamental First Amendment values 99 seems to be
in serious need of some fine tuning. As Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Roberts makes clear, the Jaycees are an organization that "first and
foremost ... promotes and practices the art of solicitation and management. "100 In contrast, groups such as the NAACP and ACLU have
been at the heart of political struggles for public justice in this country
for decades. It is this latter type of political activity that ranks at the top
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, whereas the Jaycees' type
of private-regarding activity in pursuit of financial self-interest ranks
much farther down in terms of important constitutional values. 101 A
framework that fails to distinguish between such groups seems unlikely
to be able to provide for a proper balancing between the very significant
costs of exclusion and truly central First Amendment values.
This overinclusiveness in the Court's "expressive" category seems
particularly troublesome in the present context, given what seems to be
so compelling about Nathanson's freedom of association claim; 102 that
is the political nature of a legal practice that challenges the status quo
around gender issues. 103 Justice O'Connor's variation on the Court's
framework, which would afford heightened protection to groups that are
predominately engaged in expression, would to some degree ameliorate
the above-described defect in the Court's framework. However, Justice
O'Connor's framework is also not fully adequate in at least two respects.
First, Justice O'Connor's formulation would afford heightened protection
98. But see infra Part IV .A.
99. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
100. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concuning).
101. See Soifer, supra note 90, at 657-59. See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 37-38, 79-80 (1960),
102. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
103. I leave to Part Va discussion of what is compelling in Stropnicky's competing
claim to equality regardless of gender, although much of the strength of his position is
likely to be readily apparent.
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to "predominately expressive" organizations even when their discriminatory conduct is unrelated to their expressive purposes. 104 Thus, to use
an example given by Professor Marshall, a "Save the Whales" organization would be protected under Justice O'Connor's framework in its
refusal to accept African-American members, even though such a policy
would be wholly unrelated to its expressive purposes_l0 5
More
importantly for present purposes, Justice O'Connor's formulation also
fails to account for the primary significance of political, as opposed to
other forms of expression, in the hierarchy of First Amendment
values. 106 Such a distinction would have to be made in order to
capture fully what is at stake in the dispute between Stropnicky and
Nathanson. In short, what is necessary therefore, is a framework that
can take into account both the type of association involved and the type
of expression it is engaged in when considering an association's claim
to freedom of association in the face of a competing equality claim. 107
C.

Hannah Arendt's Spheres of Human Activity

In an effort to correct for what is missing from the Supreme Court's
framework, I now turn to the writings of philosopher Hannah Arendt
regarding what she described as the three spheres of human activity. At
least two scholars have noted a congruity between Arendt's categories
and the categories of associations set forth in the Supreme Court's
above-described framework. 108 The directness of any link between
Arendt's writings and the Supreme Court's framework should not be
overstated. As will be clear from the following discussion, the
intricacies of the constitutional doctrine that was the focus of the
previous two sections were not a matter of consideration in Arendt's
writings, even when she directly addressed a decision of the Court's.
Nonetheless, Arendt's writings seem to be a particularly promising
source for providing the missing political element from the Court's
analysis, as no modern philosopher has placed a greater emphasis on the
need to encourage genuine participation in politics and the importance
of such participation to human development. 109

I04.
105.
106.

See Marshall, supra note 48, at 79.
Id.
See Soifer, supra note 90, at 657-59; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 101, at 37-38,

79-80.
107. See Soifer, supra note 90, at 657-59.
I 08. See Failinger, supra note 48; James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "Al/Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLOM. L. REV. 1463, 1551 n.392 (1990).
109. See Hannah F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY
327 (1981).
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Drawing upon the example of the ancient Greeks, Arendt saw life as
divided into three spheres of activity, the private, social, and public
realms. 110 In Greek society, the private realm was the domain of
family and household. 111 The primary objective in the private realm
was the satisfaction of material human wants and needs. 112 Thus, the
issues to be addressed in the private realm included economic production, as well as the "more direct necessities of bodily function and
species reproduction .... " 113 Because of the imperative character of
such issues, necessity ruled in the private realm. 114 At least in Greek
society, force and violence were justified in the private realm, according
to Arendt, because they are "the only means to master necessity." 115
Arendt's apparent endorsement of this disturbing view has led her critics
to accuse her of being unduly tolerant of practices such as slavery and
gender domination that have historically characterized the private
sphere. 116
At the other extreme of Arendt's three-part division is the public
realm. Arendt's historical model for the public realm was the Greek
polis. 117 In the polis, individuals, liberated from the necessity that
characterizes the private realm, came together to engage in speech and
action, the highest forms of conduct in which humans can engage, in an
effort to distinguish themselves from one another. 118 Because necessity was not present in the public realm, it was the realm of plurality and

110. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 28 (1958). See also Liebman,
supra note 108, at 1551 n.392; Pitkin, supra note 109, at 330-31. Hegel apparently
offered a similar three-part division into the realms of family, civil society and politics.
See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 291, 374 n.388 (1985), citing G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 110
(T.M. Knox trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952). See also SEYLA BENHABIB,
SITUATING THE SELF 90 (I 992).
111. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 29.
112. Id. at 30; Pitkin, supra note I 09, at 331.
113. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 331 (citing ARENDT, supra note 110, at 30).
114. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 30.
115. Id. at 31. See also Richard J. Bernstein, Rethinking the Social and the
Political, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 238, 242 ( 1986) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Rethinking]; Pitkin. supra note 109, at 331.
116. See, e.g., Bernstein. Rethinking, supra note 115, at 242; RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, HANNAH ARENDT AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 5 (1996). For more
sympathetic readings of Arendt's views on matters of gender and equality, see FEMINIST
INTERPRETATIONS OF HA1'1'AH ARENDT (Bonnie Honig ed .. I 995).
117. AREc\DT, supra note 110, al 28; Bernstein. Rethinking, supra note 115, at 241.
118. ARE!'iDT, supra note I I(), at 25; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note I 15, at 241.
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equality, where persons distinguished themselves through persuasion
rather than through force and violence. 119 Such displays of speech and
action in the public realm provided the opportunity for individuals to
achieve something "more permanent than life itself," a type of "immortality" toward which humans aspire. 120
In between Arendt's private and public realms lies the social
realm. 121 According to Arendt, this realm did not exist throughout
most of history, but rather is a relatively recent development. 122 The
social realm is the area where "private interests assume public significance." 123 Thus, formerly private interests such as economics and even
matters of personal intimacy have become public concerns. 124 In the
social realm, we "see the body of peoples and political communities in
the image of the family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of
by a gigantic nation-wide administration of housekeeping." 125 While
economic markets are classic examples of the social realm, so too is the
welfare state. 126 Indeed, Arendt characterized bureaucracy as the
governmental form of the social realm. 127
Arendt seemed to believe that modern growth of the social realm
would continue to the point of "devouring" both the private and the
public realms. 128 In this growth, Arendt saw the greatest threat of
modern society. According to Arendt, the social realm is the realm of
"behavior," where various and inumberable rules (both formal and
informal) tend to stunt spontaneous action and lead to the normalization
and routinization of human conduct. 129 To Arendt, the replacement of
action in the public realm with behavior in the social realm amounts to
nothing short of the destruction of human freedom. In the replacement
of action in the public realm with behavior in the social realm, Arendt

I 19. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 26; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 241.
120. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 333 (quoting ARENDT, supra note 110, at 58, 17-21).
121. For a more detailed discussion of Arendt' s social realm, see Hannah F. Pitkin,
Conformism, Housekeeping, and the Attack of the Blob: The Origins Of Hannah Arendt's
Concept of the Socia/, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 116, at 51 [hereinafter
Pitkin, Conformism].
122. ARENDT, supra note I 10, at 38. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 333.
123. ARENDT, supra note I 10, at 35.
124. Pitkin, Conformism, supra note 121, at 54.
125. Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 242 (quoting ARENDT, supra note
110, at 28).
126. Pitkin, Conformism, supra note 121, at 54; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note
115, at 242.
127. Pitkin, Conformism, supra note 121, at 55-56; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra
note 115, at 243.
128. Pitkin, Conformism, supra note 121, at 57.
129. Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 11 S, at 242-43.
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saw the seeds of totalitarianism and terror. 130 Therefore, Arendt
viewed as a critical task, the preservation of a "public space of politics,"
where human beings can act, rather than merely behave. 131 In order
to preserve successfully such a space, social concerns such as economics
must rigidly be kept separate from politics. 132
Not only did Arendt believe that the behavior that characterized the
social realm was incompatible with the speech and action that were
necessary to the survival of the public realm, but Arendt also believed
that the tools of reason and debate that were present in the public realm
were incapable of resolving social questions. 133 According to Arendt,
because they are private issues turned public, social questions are only
amenable to resolution through force and violence, which are incompatible with the conditions necessary to the survival of the public
sphere. 134 Therefore, the social question, along with the poor, dispossessed or compassionate persons who would advance it, 135 must be
kept separate from politics for this reason as well. 136
D.

Balancing Freedom of Association and Equality Claims in
Arendt's Three Spheres

Arendt's private, social, and public spheres correspond roughly to the
three categories of associations established by the Supreme Court in its
cases presenting conflicts between asserted claims of freedom of
association and claimed rights of equal access to public accommodations.137 However, differences in content and scope caused Arendt to
reach some different (as well as some similar) conclusions from the
Court as to whether the principle of freedom of association or the
equality principle should be preferred when they come into conflict
within a particular sphere. For example, as was pointed out above,
Arendt's public realm is an arena where distinctions are made according

130.
131.
132.
133.
HANNAH
134.
244.
135.
136.
137.

Pitkin, supra note 109, at 334; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 244.
BENHABIB, supra note 110, at 90.
Pitkin, supra note 109, at 334-35.
Arendt would later identify the existence of poverty as the social question. See
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 86 (1965).
Pitkin, supra note 109, at 334-35; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at

See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
Pitkin, supra note 109, at 335; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 245.
See supra Part III.A.
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to speech, debate, persuasion, and reason. 138 However, an atmosphere
conducive to such a discourse can only exist where the participants enjoy
a high degree of equality. 139
Arendt acknowledges that the Greek notion of equality, which
governed in her model public sphere, the polis, 140 had very little to do
with modem notions of equality. The Greek notion of equality "meant
to live among and to have to deal only with one's peers, and it
presupposed the existence of 'unequals' who [would be excluded from
the political sphere] . . . [and] were always the majority of the
population in a city-state." 141 As pointed out above, 142 Arendt's
failure to attack this notion vigorously has led to much criticism of her
views. Of course, absolute equality would also prevent the existence of
a public sphere, as there would be no need under such circumstances to
engage in debate or efforts to persuade others because everyone would
already be in agreement, and there would be no capacity for persons to
distinguish themselves from one another. 143
Therefore, what is
necessary to political action is something of an equilibrium between
similarity and difference, a condition that Arendt refers to as "plurality."
"Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same,
that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone
else who ever lived, lives, or will live." 144
The importance of equality in the public realm is one reason why
Arendt argued that persons may only enter the public realm after they
have been "liberated" from the necessity that governs the private realm,
and have left behind its force and violence that are required to master
necessity, but are incompatible with the discourse that yields public
freedom. 145 Thus, Arendt would likely have argued that in the public
realm, the equality principle should trump any conflicting freedom of
association claims. 146 In contrast, as pointed out above, 147 by afford-

I 38. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
See also Bernstein,
Rethinking, supra note 115, at 241.
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 1 I 7 and accompanying text.
141. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 32. See also Pitkin, supra note 109, at 331.
142. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
143. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 8.
144. Id.
145. Bernstein. Rethinking, supra note 115, at 242.
146. See Liebman. supra note 108, at 1551 n.392. Of course, the freedom of
association principle was not without value for Arendt in the public sphere. Indeed, the
very existence of a public sphere is dependent on the presence of at least some
associates with whom one can debate or make efforts to persuade and who can bear
witness to one's speech and action. See Failinger, supra note 48, at 162.
147. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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ing heightened constitutional protection to expressive associations, the
Supreme Court has indicated that it will generally privilege freedom of
association claims over equality claims in the public sphere. 148
On the other hand, as is also discussed above, 149 Arendt viewed the
private sphere as the realm within which matters of necessity are
addressed. Because such matters can only be addressed through force
and violence, equality has no place in the private realm. 150 Arendt saw
families historically as having a single interest, and a single opinion, that
was determined "by the household head who ruled in accordance with
it and prevented possible disunity among the family members." 151
Therefore, Arendt would probably privilege claims of freedom of
association over conflicting claims of equality within the private
sphere. 152 Here, Arendt's priorities are consistent with those of the
Supreme Court, which also gives preference to claims of freedom of
association over claims of equality in its intimate/personal category by
providing heightened scrutiny to regulatory enactments infringing on
such intimate or personal associations. 153 One should note, however,
that the Supreme Court's intimate/personal category is probably a good
bit narrower than Arendt's private sphere. While the Supreme Court
limits its heightened protection to intimate associations concerning
matters traditionally related to families and/or family life, 154 and to
other, undefined but very small-scale personal relationships, 155
Arendt's private realm includes a broader range of associations including
those relating to economics, labor, and work. 156
Based on the above, it unclear how Arendt would evaluate competing
claims of freedom of association and claims to equality in her social

148. But see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding
application of Minnesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees despite use of
heightened scrutiny).
149. See supra notes 111-15.
150. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 32.
151. Id. at 39-40. With the rise of society, Arendt saw this singularity of interest
and opinion as characterizing the entire nation, which acts as one enormous family. Id.
at 39.
152. Arendt's failure to condemn vigorously historical practices in the private sphere
such as slavery and gender domination seems to support this view.
153. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
156. Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 239-41.
Note that Arendt
distinguished between labor and work. See ARENDT, supra note 110, at 7.
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realm. Indeed, much about Arendt's social realm is ambiguous. 157
However, to the extent that Arendt's social realm is merely the private
realm gone public, 158 and society is "the facsimile of one superhuman
family," 159 then it seems that Arendt's view that the equality principle
has no place in the private realm would also extend to the social realm.
This is also consistent with Arendt's view that because social questions
involve claims of necessity (and thus can only be resolved through force
and violence), they must be kept out of the public realm, where equality
must reign. 160 Thus, it seems that Arendt would privilege the freedom
of association principle over the equality principle in her social realm.
This, recall, contrasts with the low-level of scrutiny the Supreme Court
gives to regulatory restrictions of freedom of association on grounds of
equality where the association is neither intimate, personal, nor
expressive, but rather falls into its "other" category, 161 that corresponds
to Arendt's social realm. 162 Thus, the Court can be said to prefer
equality claims in this sphere.
This reading of how Arendt would evaluate competing claims of
freedom of association and equality in her social realm is consistent with
the interpretation advanced by Professor Failinger in her article regarding
Arendt's position on the school desegregation crisis of the 1950s. 163
In a controversial article that appeared in Dissent magazine, 164 Arendt
criticized the government-enforced desegregation of the Little Rock,
Arkansas public schools. In terms of the above-described typology,
Arendt saw education as a matter that traditionally fell within the private
realm, but presently had aspects that fell within the social realm as
well. 165
Because of this, the white schoolchildren's parents'
associational choices not to have their children associate with the city's
African-American schoolchildren, were to be preferred over the AfricanAmerican schoolchildren's parents' claim to equal access. 166 Failinger

157. See Pitkin, Conformism, supra note 121, at 55-56.
158. See supra notes I 23-25 and accompanying text.
159. ARENDT, supra note 110, at 29.
160. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
162. See Failinger, supra note 48, at 165-66; Liebman, supra note 108, at 1551
n.392.
163. See Failinger, supra note 48.
164. Hannah Arendt. Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT 45 (1959).
165. Id. at 55. See also Failinger, supra note 48, at 165.
166. Falinger, supra note 48, at 165. Arendt's views on the school desegregation
crisis were in fact a good deal more elaborate than the above-discussion suggests.
Among other things, Arendt deplored the fact that children were being asked to cross
boundaries that their parents had not dared to challenge. Arendt, supra note 164, at 50.
Arendt also feared the effect on the white schoolchildren of the mixed message that they
received from the fact that their parents supported segregation while their government
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criticizes both Arendt's characterization of education as falling within the
private and social realms rather than the public realm, 167 as well as her
view that freedom of association should trump the antidiscrimination
principle within the social realm, 168 Thus, Failinger concludes that
Arendt erred in her opposition to school desegregation in Little
Rock, 169 Of course, Failinger's view as to the appropriate outcome is
consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions on school desegregation, 170 In terms of the Court's own framework for evaluating conflicting claims of freedom of association and equality of access, its results
in its school desegregation decisions can be described as involving a
determination that educational associations fall within the intermediate
category between intimate/personal associat10ns and expressive
associations, where regulatory efforts in support of equal access will
generally survive the low-level of scrutiny employed in response to
freedom of association claims, 171
E,

A Critique of Arendt's Framework

Arendt's three-part division of the spheres of human act1V1ty is
susceptible to a variety of further critiques, First, Arendt's private
realm, in which force and violence are used to master the necessity of
bodily and material imperatives, suggests tolerance of a degree of
dominance and subordination that is simply unacceptable by contempo-

supported integration. The result, she thought, would be a vacuum of authority that the
children would fill with "mob rule," a precursor to totalitarianism. Id. at 55-56. Indeed,
the central image of Arendt's article is that of a jeering mob of white children chasing
an African-American child away from the school house. Id. at 50, 56.
Failinger points out that Arendt never publicly retracted her opposition to the
government-enforced integration of the Little Rock schools. See Failinger, supra note
48, at 158.
However, Arendt's biographer Elisabeth Young-Bruehl cites later
correspondence between Arendt and the novelist Ralph Ellison in which Arendt
acknowledged that she had failed to consider the African-American "ideal of sacrifice"
identified by Ellison and the extent to which school integration served as a rite of
passage in the African-American child's internalization of that ideal. See YOUNGBRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 316 (1982).
167. Failinger, supra note 48, at 164-69.
168. Id. at 182-85.
169. Id. at 187-88
170. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171. See Liebman, supra note 108, at 1551 n.392; accord Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). However, it
should be noted that these decisions pre-date the framework established in Roberts.
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rary standards. 172 Moreover, Arendt's private realm fails to account
adequately for those intimate relationships that are constitutive of
personal identity and are critical to human development. 173
As
Professor Bernstein points out, modern notions of privacy, what Arendt
referred to as "intimacy," did not figure into the "classic private/household and public/political division" that formed the basis for
Arendt's work. 174 As for love, which Arendt thought could only
survive in the private sphere, professor Pitkin points out that Arendt did
have some appreciation for its ability to lead to self-revelation. 175
However, Arendt does not appear to have sufficiently appreciated the
capacity of intimate personal relationships to be foundational to the kind
of identity development that is necessary to participation in the public
realm. Nor does she appear to have paid much attention to the utility of
such intimate associations as a bulwark against the encroaching mass
society that Arendt so greatly feared.
Arendt's public realm is also susceptible to criticism on grounds that
it is too narrow both in terms of who may participate in public
deliberation and in terms of the substance of public deliberations. In
order to participate in public deliberation, according to Arendt, a person
must have been liberated from the bonds of necessity. 176 This is
because claims of necessity may not be addressed by the persuasion and
deliberation that must govern in the public sphere. Rather, such claims
of necessity produce rage and must be satisfied through violence, which
is destructive of the public sphere. Arendt offers the example of the
failure of the French Revolution in support of this point. "When the
poor, driven by the needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene of the
French Revolution ... necessity appeared with them, and the result was
that the power of the old regime [became] impotent and the new republic
was stillborn." 177
Thus, according to Arendt, the poor must be kept shrouded in the
private realm, where they can attend to their basic economic needs. 178
By similar reasoning, the women and slaves subjected to domination in

172. See Failinger, supra note 48. at 178.
173. See, e.g .. Karst, supra note 96; Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493, 1533 (1987).
174. Bernstein, Rethinking. supra note 115, at 242.
175. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 332 (quoting ARENDT, supra note 110, at 51, 242).
176. This view is echoed in contemporary republican conceptions of property rights
as constitutive of the independence necessary to participate in public deliberation. See,
e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of
Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987); William H. Simon. Social-Republican
Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1991).
177. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 335 (quoting ARENDT. supra note 133, at 108).
178. Pitkin. supra note 109, at 335.
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the private realm in the name of mastering necessity would also be
excluded from the public realm. Indeed, as Professor Bernstein points
out, the two examples Arendt relies upon as the best historical examples
of the kind of deliberative process she envisions, the Greek polis and the
American Revolution, "occurred at a time when slavery was acceptable
and justified, and when women (and many others) were not considered
fit to be citizens." 179
Aside from the fact that exclusion of the poor and dispossessed from
public deliberation is completely incompatible with contemporary
notions of equality, personhood and human dignity, Arendt's willingness
to exclude certain persons from the polis deprives those left to participate from the benefit of the rich voices, perspectives, and experiences of
those relegated to "outsider" status. As Frank Michelman states with
regard to the change in dominant consciousness that accompanied the
fall of de jure segregation in this country: "[D]oes anyone doubt the
primary and crucial role in this instance of the emergent social presence
and self-emancipatory activity of Black Americans? Does anyone doubt
that their impact on the rest of us has reflected their own oppositional
understandings of their situation .... " 180 A sacrifice of such voices
is too great, if the content or outcome of deliberations in the public
sphere is to have any independent worth.
According to Arendt, not only must the poor and dispossessed
themselves be kept from participation in the public sphere, 181 but
arguments advanced on their behalf by their "well-fed" proponents, to
address poor people's own claims of social and economic necessity,
must also be excluded from the public realm. Such arguments are likely
to be motivated by pity and compassion, emotions which like the poor's

179. Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 249. Bernstein further explains
Arendt's praise for the American Revolution (in contrast to her criticism of the French
Revolution) as resulting from its character as "essentially a political revolution dedicated
primarily to the founding and constitution of political freedom. It was not primarily
concerned with liberation from biological necessity, or even with liberation from
oppressive rulers." Id. at 244 (emphasis in original). However, Bernstein later
characterizes the American Revolution as a quest for social liberation. Id. at 255.
I 80. Michelman, supra note 173, at 1530 (citations omitted).
181. Pitkin offers a limited defense of Arendt against charges of hostility to the poor
(Pitkin, supra note 109, at 341) and to women (id. at 341-42), while nonetheless arguing
for a public sphere much broader in scope than that advocated by Arendt.
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claims of necessity, cannot be addressed through debate and persuasion,
but rather can only be addressed through force and violence. 182
If all claims by and on behalf of those in economic or social need
must be excluded from the public realm, the question must be asked,
what is left to talk about there? 183 Bernstein quotes Mary McCarthy,
a friend and supportive critic of Arendt's, 184 who put the question
directly to Arendt at a 1972 conference on Arendt's work:
[I]f all questions of economics, human welfare, busing, anything that touches
the social sphere, are to be excluded from the political scene, then I am
mystified. I am left with war and speeches. But the speeches can't be just
speeches. They have to be speeches about something. 185

According to Bernstein, Arendt's response was "evasive and feeble."186 Indeed, Arendt's view that the highest end of speech and
action in the public sphere is for the individual to achieve immortal fame
or permanent rememberence, conjures up images, as Pitkin states, of
"posturing little boys clamoring for attention . . . wanting to be
reassured that they are brave, valuable, even real." 187 As Pitkin further
states, "[n]o account of politics or the public can be right that wholly
empties them of substantive content, of what is at stake." 188 Yet in her
effort to preserve a sphere of public freedom, in which action can
flourish, Arendt left no room for addressing the many questions of social
justice that can only be answered through politics. 189
Despite this critique, there is much worth preserving in Arendt's
conception of the public realm. Particularly appealing is Arendt's
celebration of politics at a time when public perceptions of politics and
the worthiness of participation therein are at an apparent low. 190 As
Pitkin points out, Arendt draws upon Aristotle in her view that humans

182.

Pitkin, supra note 109, at 342; Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 244-

45.
183. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 337.
184. See HANNAH ARENDT & MARY McCARTHY, BETWEEN FRIENDS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF HANNAH ARENDT AND MARY MCCARTHY, 1949-1975 (Carol
Birmingham ed., 1995).
185. Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 250.
186. Id. at 25 I.
187. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 338. Pitkin goes on to argue that Arendt could not
have meant to celebrate the mere posturing that the above reading of her writings
suggests. Id. at 341.
188. Id. at 342.
189. See Bernstein, Rethinking, supra note 115, at 252-53.
190. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 327. See also E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE
POLITICS (1991); WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1992). Bernstein properly points out that Arendt's public
sphere clearly implicates more than merely voting or traditional party politics. Bernstein,
Rethinking, supra note 115. at 256.
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will reach their highest potential in polis citizenship. 191 However,
according to Pitkin, rather than celebrating the polis as a means for "the
agonal striving to distinguish oneself before one's peers and become
immortal[,]" 192 Aristotle championed the polis as a means to achieve
justice. 193 Invariably questions of justice involve issues of "economic
privilege and social power." 194 Therefore, according to Pitkin, the key
to realizing Arendt's ambition for public freedom is not to banish "the
social question" from public life as Arendt suggests, but rather "to make
it political in order to render it amenable to human action and direction."195
F.

The Supreme Court and Arendt: A Reconstruction

By taking together the Supreme Court's categories of associations,
Arendt's three spheres of human activity, and the critiques presented of
each of these formulations, it is possible to reconstruct categories that
provide a useful framework for evaluating Nathanson's claim of freedom
of association against Stropnicky's claim of equal access to counsel.
I.

Political Associations

The Supreme Court's category of expressive associations is
overinclusive because it would provide heightened protection to
associations, such as the Jaycees, that exist primarily to advance the
personal social and economic aims of their members. 196 Arendt was
surely correct in at least fearing the potentially corrupting effect on the
public realm of claims of economic self-interest or other similar issues
that she would have preferred be confined to the private realm. The
recent congressional hearings into possible illegal campaign contributions

191. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 338 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 5-6 (Sir Ernest
Barker, trans., 1958)). For a critique of legal writers' use (or misuse) of Aristotle's
conception of politics, see Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously, 82 CAL. L. REV.
329 (1994).
I 92. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 338.
193. The primary thesis of Pitkin's fabulous essay is that Arendt's vision of politics
needs to be infused with modem conceptions of justice.
194. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 339.
195. Id. at 346.
196. See supra Part III.B.
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to the two major political parties 197 and the devastating effects of big
money on participation in electoral politics 198 are clear illustrations of
this problem. Pitkin is surely aware of this danger too when she states
that private power may become sufficiently great such that "it may even
outweigh and control the formally defined public realm, in effect making
policy for the whole society in the private interest and under the control
of the few." 199
However, Pitkin seems to believe that the public realm has something
of a self-regulating mechanism that will prevent realization of Arendt's
worst fears. Though persons may
come to politics with [their] private interest firmly in hand, seeking by any
means necessary to get as much as [they] can out of the system[,] ... actual
participation in political action, deliberation, and conflict may make us aware
of our more remote and indirect connection with others, the long-range and
large-scale significance of what we want and are doing. 2()()

We may be drawn into politics "by personal need, fear, ambition or
interest," but once in the arena, "[ w]e are forced, as Joseph Tussman has
put it, to transform 'I want' into 'I am entitled to,' a claim that becomes
negotiable by public standards." 201
I am much less sanguine than Pitkin about the capacity of the public
sphere to transform the "claiming" behavior of certain private and selfregarding interests. The above-cited examples demonstrate that forays
into politics by aggregations of self-regarding interests such as large
corporations and political pressure groups have shown a much greater
capacity to transform the political sphere into something far from the
realm of public freedom that Arendt sought. Thus, Arendt was on the
right track in trying to limit the entry of corrosive agents into the
political realm and to preserve a space for public freedom.

197. See, e.g., Andrew Ferguson, My Hearings Right or Huang, WKLY STANDARD,
July 28. 1997, at 24; Andrew Ferguson, What If They Held a Hearing and Nobody
Came?, WKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4, 1997, at 23; Following the Money, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 28, 1997, at 9; Inside the Belly of the Beast, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997; David
Shribman, 0 Democracy!/Politics, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 34.
198. See, e.g., Marty Jetzer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and
the Subversion of American Democracy, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 467
(1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994). But
see David J. Weidman, The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance: Rejecting the
Hysterical Call for Publicly Financed Congressional Campaigns, 63 TENN. L. REV. 775
(1996).
199. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 344.
200. Id. at 347.
201. Id. (quoting JOSEPH TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 78-81,
108, 116-117 (1960)).
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However, Arendt's public realm is underinclusive in terms of who and
what will be admitted into the realm of politics, I absolutely reject,
along with Pitkin, Bernstein and Arendt's other critics, the notion that
entry into the public realm ought to be limited on grounds of wealth,
gender, status in society, or a desire to address questions of poverty and
inequality. Nonetheless, it is possible to envision a middle ground
between the Supreme Court and Arendt's formulations, with the limiting
principle being the presence of a genuine willingness to embrace the
Aristotelian "spirit" of the polis that Pitkin refers to. 202 That spirit is
a willingness to engage in a collective search for the public good, 203
as opposed to the desire to get as much out of the system for oneself as
is possible.204 Such a conception of a political sphere is certainly
broad enough to address the claims of Pitkin's "alienated and apathetic
oppressed, who do not approach politics with their self-interest firmly in
hand, ... [but whose] personal trouble comes to be seen as an
actionable public issue, a matter of justice," 205 However, it would not
include the above-cited 206 example of Pitkin's reconstructed homo
faber,20?
Such a framework, which would provide heightened protection to
associations desiring to engage in collective deliberations regarding the
common good, what I will refer to as political associations, also has the
advantage of providing for the primacy of political activity in the
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and thus is capable of evaluating
what is laudatory about Nathanson's practice in a way that the Supreme
Court's unreconstructed framework is not. 208 Obviously, making
determinations as to which associations will be entitled to heightened
protection on the above-described grounds will be a difficult task. Those
entering the public realm for self-seeking purposes will always be able
to hire skillful lawyers to dress up their claims of private interest in
terms of the public good. However, at least in the context of constitu202. Id. at 338, 346.
203. Id. at 339.
204. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 101, at 37.
205. Pitkin, supra note 109, at 347-48; accord MEIKLEJOHN, supra note IOI, at 38.
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207. According to Pitkin, Arendt's homo Jaber is the technical thinker who is
constantly searching for the best possible means to achieve his or her own private ends.
Pitkin, supra note 109, at 340. It is homo Jaber who enters public life seeking to claim
as much from the system for him or herself as is possible.
208. See supra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.
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tional adjudication, it is possible to distinguish associations that have
formed to assert claims of public justice, such as the NAACP-led
boycott in Claiborne Hardware 209 and the ACLU-Jed effort to force
accountability for the government-coerced sterilization of Medicaid
applicants in In re Primus, 210 from associations formed to promote the
personal economic and social interests of their members, often through
exclusionary practices that are no longer considered acceptable. 211
While the Court may have erred in its effort to draw such a line in
Roberts, the reconstructed framework provides an opportunity for
promoting the type of vibrant public realm that Arendt envisioned, while
preserving that realm against some of the destructive forces that Arendt
so feared.
The above reasoning appears to support the balance struck by the
Supreme Court in favoring claims of freedom of association over claims
of equality (by applying strict scrutiny to legislative restrictions on
freedom of association) with regard to political associations. 212
However, Arendt is surely right that even in an expanded public realm,
a high degree of equality must be present in order for the type of speech,
debate, and persuasion necessary for public freedom to occur. 213 Thus,
perhaps what is necessary with regard to legislative restrictions on the
freedom of political associations is a form of "hard-look" review, 214
that engages in a genuine consideration of competing claims, rather than
the mechanistic, "strict in theory, fatal in fact" 215 application of strict
scrutiny, or the "wink and a nod" application of low-level scrutiny that
has characterized previous Court decisions. Perhaps the Court in
Roberts engaged in just that sort of review when it upheld application
of Minnesota's public accommodations law to the Jaycees despite
nominally applying strict scrutiny. 216 In any event, Part V of this
Article will be devoted to such an evaluation of the competing claims
advanced by Stropnicky and Nathanson.

209. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 886 (1982).
210. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412. 412 (1978)
211. See, e.g .. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 537 (1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 1
(1988),
212. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
214. See Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 69 (I 985).
215. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
216. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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2.

Private Associations

The provision of heightened constitutional protection to certain
intimate associations within the Court's framework 217 seems to present
the opportunity to compensate for Arendt's failure to appreciate fully the
importance of such associations within her conception of the private
realm. 218 Unfortunately, the Court has not always protected adequately
those intimite associations that are constitutive of the sense of personal
identity that is necessary to participation in the public realm. 219
Nonetheless, the Court has in fact expressed sensitivity to the need for
heightened protection of the private realm. The Court's observation that
"to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State[,]" 220
can provide a useful basis for a workable conception of a private realm
worthy of heightened protection. 221
On the other hand, the Court's willingness to extend such heightened
protection to other, non-intimate, small-scale personal groups, 222 fails
to advance either the value of certain intimate relationships as foundational to the type of identity that is necessary in the public realm, or
other values important to the public realm (except to the extent that such
groups are engaged in political activity, in which case they will fall
within the previous category of political associations anyway). While
persons do develop some sense of identity from belonging to such
groups, Arendt pointed out in Reflections that this is not the type of
personal identity that is constitutive of genuine politics. 223 Thus, the
proper scope of a private realm entitled to heightened constitutional
protection should be restricted to intimate relationships, and the small-

217. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
219. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1532 (criticizing the Court's failure in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to protect intimate homosexual relationships
as constitutive of identity and citizenship).
220. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
221. Note that here, the Court and Arendt's preference for the freedom of
association principle over the equality principle in the private realm are consistent. See
supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
223. See Arendt, supra note I 64, at 51.
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scale groups that the Court discusses should be relegated to the
following category.

3.

Social/Commercial Associations

Finally, the Supreme Court's willingness to allow the community as
a whole (through its elected representatives) significant leeway in its
efforts to regulate associations that do not fall within either of the
Court's categories of expressive or intimate/personal associations,
provides a possible means to control the sprawl of Arendt's social realm
that she so greatly feared. As Pitkin puts it:
Most aspects of social life are left to evolve through drift and private power.
Many activities probably can be successfully conducted only in that way. But
the distinctive promise of political freedom remains the possibility of genuine
collective action, an entire community consciously and jointly shaping its
policy, its way of life. . . . [C]itizenship enables us jointly to take charge of
and take responsibility for the social forces that otherwise dominate our lives
and limit our options, even though we produce them.224

In its above-described framework, the Supreme Court's privileging of
public efforts, in the form of anti-discrimination legislation, to control
the spread of social forces such as racial and gender bias, is worthy of
support, representing a policy that's preferable to Arendt's willingness
to let freedom of association trump equality in the social/commercial
realm.
As "reconstructed" above, the three-part division into private, social/commercial, and political associations, and the corresponding
balance between freedom of association claims and equality claims
within each category may provide one mechanism for preserving a
thriving public realm-an idea that is central to Arendt's thinking as
well as to First Amendment jurisprudence. The reconstructed framework
may also provide a means for protecting those foundational intimate
relationships that are also necessary to the existence of such a public
realm. For this reason, it is worth inquiring which category within this
framework Nathanson's law practice falls within, recalling that she
represents only women in divorce cases. 225

224. Pitkin, supra note l09, at 344.
225. Of course, Nathanson's decision to associate only with women divorce clients,
is merely the flip-side of her decision not to associate with Stropnicky for purposes of
his divorce case. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 234-35 (1977).
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IV.

WHAT TYPE OF ASSOCIATION IS NATHANSON'S LAW PRACTICE?

The next step of the analysis is to determine which category of
association within the reconstructed framework we should place
Nathanson's legal practice.

A.

Is Nathanson '.5 Law Practice a Private Association?

Nathanson's law practice seems an unlikely candidate for categorization as a private association within our reconstructed framework.
Lawyer-client relationships intuitively seem to be much less personal
than the familial and related types of relationships that the Court has
previously considered to fall within its intimate category. 226 This
category roughly corresponds to the reconstructed framework's private
association category. 227 Charles Fried has analogized the relationship
between lawyer and client to one between friends. 228 However, it does
not seem that friendships, beyond perhaps the closest personal kind,
ought to fall within the private association category in our reconstructed
framework. As Professor Marshall points out, most friendships implicate
"the values of intimate association ... to a much lesser degree than in
family-type relationships because the depth of involvement and the
emotional stake of the participants are not as great." 229 Fried does not
go so far as to depict lawyer/client relationships as analogous to very
close personal friendships. Instead, Fried categorizes the lawyer along
with certain "special purpose friends," whose care and concern are
limited in scope in a way that is not the case with family members and
loved ones. 230 Thus, it seems clear that the attorney/client relationships created by Nathanson's law practice ought not be considered
private associations for purposes of our reconstructed framework.

226. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part III.F.2.
228. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 ( 1976).
229. Marshall, supra note 48, at 82 n.91. Professor Karst seems to take a more
expansive view in terms of inclusion of close friendships within a category of
constitutionally protected intimate associations, but he too acknowledges that the case
for inclusion of friendships is weaker than the one for inclusion of family-type
relationships. See Karst, supra note 96, at 629 & n.26.
230. Fried, supra note 228, at I 071.
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B.

Is Nathanson 's Law Practice a Commercial Association?231

Nathanson earns her living through her practice. Therefore, it is
tempting simply to characterize Nathanson's law practice as a commercial association, as she provides for her basic material needs such as
food and shelter by offering legal services in exchange for money. 232
However, it is certainly the case that many persons involved in what
would likely be considered political associations, such as unions,
political campaigns, and advocacy groups, receive some sort of
compensation for their work. Thus, the mere fact that Nathanson
receives compensation for her work ought not be dispositive as to
deciding the category of association into which her practice falls.
Moreover, according to the current dominant view of legal practice,
described as the "professional model," 233 remuneration is considered
to be merely incidental to legal practice. According to Professor Russell
Pearce, the essence of the professional model
is a bargain between the profession and society: The profession agree[s] to use
its skills 234 for the good of its clients and the public. In exchange for this
promise, society cede[s] authority to the profession, including the exclusive
right to practice law and autonomy from government and to some extent,
market regulation. 235

231. I do not think it necessary to address separately the question of whether
Nathanson's law practice should be considered to be a "social'' association, which would
also cause it to be located within the reconstructed framework's intermediate category.
Suffice to say that Nathanson's law practice does not seem remotely analogous to the
many types of associations, ranging from groups such as country clubs to soccer teams,
that people join to develop friendships or other types of social relationships, that are not
sufficiently intimate to place such groups within the private association category, but
nonetheless may contribute greatly to one's personal sense of welfare. See Marshall,
supra note 48, at 82.
232. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975)
("exchange of [legal services] for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of
that word").
233. See, e.g., Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION I, 144 (Robert L. Nelson et. al. eds., 1992);
William H. Simon, Babbit v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 565 (1985).
234. The professional model assumes that the skills offered for sale by lawyers are
beyond those possessed by laypersons, and that the "esoteric knowledge" possessed by
lawyers is needed by laypersons at certain times. Russell Pearce, The Professional
Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1995).
235. Id. at 1238. Pearce describes the professional model as a "paradigm," as that
term is used by Thomas S. Kuhn in his landmark book. See THOMAS H. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). According to Pearce, the
"Professionalism Paradigm" emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, following the
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While it is understood within the professional model that lawyers will
be compensated, perhaps even handsomely, for their willingness to share
their expertise, it is believed that "[i]n contrast to businesspersons, who
maximize financial self-interest, altruistic lawyers place the interests of
the common good and of their clients above their own financial and
other self-interests," 236
Three central elements of the professional model can be identified
from the above description: (1) the primacy of client interests; (2)
protection of the public good; and (3) the incidental nature of the
lawyer's financial interests, Of these, the third seems most significant
to the question of whether Nathanson's law practice should be considered to be a commercial association. A discussion of this element
follows. The other two central tenets of the professional model will be
discussed in the next section considering whether Nathanson's law
practice ought to be categorized as a political association.
It seems highly likely that the average layperson would vigorously
dispute the professional model's assertion that financial self-interest is
merely incidental to the practice of law, This view is not without basis,
as there is ample evidence to suggest that large numbers of lawyers have
come increasingly to view their work as a means towards maximizing
their financial position, 237 thus rendering them more and more like
Arendt's homo Jaber. An increasing number of legal academics,
including, among others, Pearce and Anthony Kronman, 238 have

then-dominant "Republican Paradigm's" inability to resolve what he calls the "BusinessProfession dichotomy" (the distinction between a business and a profession) in the
practice of law. Pearce, supra note 234, at 1241. The Republican Paradigm, which held
"that individual professionals ... were above the self-interest of the market [and) served
as guardians of the public good," was undermined by what was perceived to be a period
of increasing economic selfishness on the part of lawyers. Id. The thesis of Pearce's
provocative article is that the Professionalism Paradigm has similarly failed to resolve
the Business-Profession dichotomy, and is in the process of being replaced, in the
Kuhnian sense, by a "Business Paradigm," pursuant to which the practice of law will
be conceived of more strictly as a business, as opposed to a profession. Id. at 1232.
236. Id. at 1239.
237. Id. at 1250-53; Simon, supra note 233, at 579. Pearce denominates the bar's
method of enforcing the subordination of attorney financial interests tenet of the
professional model as the "Profit Maximizer" taboo. Pearce, supra note, 234, at I 24243. He describes recent examples of "rent-seeking" behavior on the part of lawyers in
terms of widespread violations of the "Profit Maximizer" taboo.
238. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: THE FALLJNG IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 294-95 (1993).
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concluded that the subordination of lawyer financial self-interest that was
critical to maintenance of the professional model is quickly becoming a
thing of the past, if it ever existed at all.
Pearce locates the beginnings of the ascendency of lawyer financial
self-interest in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona. 239 In Bates, the Court stuck down bans on
lawyer advertising as violative of First Amendment protections of
commercial speech. 240 Pearce identifies such bans as having been of
central importance to the professional model's subordination of attorney
financial self-interest tenet. 241 However, in Bates, the Court embraced
the notion of the lawyer as a self-interested business person. 242 The
Court has subsequently extended Bates' reasoning to strike down a
variety of limitations on lawyers' commercial activities. 243 Nathanson
advertises for clients and engages in a variety of business-like practices
in an effort to promote her firm. 244
Another example of the Supreme Court's view of lawyering as
primarily remunerative activity can be seen in its decision in Hishon v.
King and Spaulding, 245 where the Court upheld the application of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a law firm's decision regarding
whether to make a particular female lawyer a partner. The Court clearly
considered a law firm partnership to constitute a commercial association
in terms of its previously-described framework. From this conclusion,
the Court applied only low-level scrutiny to Title VII's limitation on the
partners' asserted right of freedom of association, upholding the statute's

239. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
240. Id.
241. Pearce, supra note 234, at 1243 & n.62.
242. "In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength
of his arm or the force of his mind." 433 U.S. at 371.
243. See, e.g .. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496
U.S. 91 ( 1990) (pennitting advertising of certification as a specialist); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (overturning ban on direct mailings); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (prohibiting ban on offering legal
information regarding nature of potential claims and on use of illustrations to catch
reader's attention); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (prohibiting, among other things,
ban on lawyer's advertising admission to practice before Supreme Court). But see
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida Rules creating
a 30-day period following an accident during which lawyers may not target solicitations
at accident victims or their families); Ohralik v.Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978) (upholding ban on in-person solicitation for profit). Pearce suggests that Florida
Bar may be a step towards the full Court heeding the request of Justices O'Connor,
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in their dissent in Shapero for a reconsideration of
the ruling in Bates. Pearce, supra note 234, at 1250 n. l 08. Nonetheless, he is confident
that such a ruling would do little to resolve the crisis of the professional model. Id.
244. See supra Part II.
245. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
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application, 246 His hon, of course, is not directly on point because it
focused on the association created by attorneys' choice of partners rather
than their choice of clients, However, it is further evidence of the
erosion of the incidental nature of attorney financial self-interest tenet of
the professional model,
In sum, it seems like there is not enough left of the subordination of
attorney financial self-interest tenet for it, in itself, to prevent characterization of Nathanson's law practice as a commercial association for
purposes of our reconstructed framework, On the other hand, there is
no evidence that Nathanson's rejection of Stropnicky as a client was in
fact motivated by commercial concerns, Although we don't have
enough information in the sketch that I've provided to know this for
certain, it seems likely that Nathanson 's rejection of Stropnicky as a
client worked against her short term financial interests, by costing her a
potential pay check, Thus, while there are certainly elements leading
one to characterize Nathanson's law practice as a commercial association, these elements are not so strong as to necessarily outweigh political
elements in her practice, the subject of the next section,
C.

Is Nathanson s Law Practice A Political Association?

Nathanson's law practice can be viewed from a couple of possible
perspectives for purposes of determining whether it ought to be
categorized as a political association within our reconstructed framework,
The first is that of the professional model, The first two subsections
within this section will focus on whether Nathanson's practice should be
considered to be a political association in light of the professional
model's two remaining identified tenets: the primacy of client interests
and protection of the public good, An alternative perspective from
which one can view Nathanson's law practice is that of the public
interest lawyering model.

246,

Id. at 78.
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The Professional Model Perspective
a.

The Primacy of Client Interests

As it has matured, the professional model presents the view that "a
lawyer [shall] act as a partisan advocate on behalf of her client. " 247
"[A] lawyer is expected to devote energy, intelligence, skill, and
personal commitment to the single goal of furthering the client's interests
as those are ultimately defined by the client." 248 As set forth in one
of the two closest approximations to an authoritative codification of the
tenets of the professional model, 249 the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer represent a client "zealously,"250 and may not "fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client." 251
Rules protecting attorney-client communications as confidential, 252 and
broadly prohibiting lawyers from representing conflicting interests, 253
also narrow the scope of the lawyer's focus to the client's immediate
interests. While professional responsibility rules grant lawyers a good
deal of discretion with regard to strategy and tactics, i.e., the means by
which a client's objectives will be pursued, 254 defining the substance,
purpose, and message of the legal representation are responsibilities that
rest firmly with the client. 255

247. Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2495 (1993).
248. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.3, at 578 (1986).
249. The other one being the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
250. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7, DR 7-101 (1980)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. It was this set of provisions that governed Nathanson's law
practice at the time the matter arose. However, effective January I, 1998, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted a new set of professional responsibility
standards for Massachusetts attorneys based on the Model Rules. See SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT RULE 3:07 (1998).
251. MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at DR 7-lOl(A). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.2(a) (1980) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation .... ") [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
252. MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at DR 4- 10 I; MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 1.6. Exceptions are provided, however, where the lawyer's fee is in dispute or
where the attorney is charged with misconduct. See MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at
DR 4-10l(c)(4); MODEL RULES, supra note 251, at Rule l.6(b)(2).
253. MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at DR 5-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 1.7.
254. Cahn, supra note 247, at 2498-99. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 1.2 cmt. I ("In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for
technical and legal tactical issues .... ").
255. Cahn, supra note 247, at 2498-99. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 ("'The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by the legal representation .... ") The well-known "client-centered" approach
to lawyering, see DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS-A CLIENT-
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Given the radical subordination of substantive attorney goals to those
of clients within the professional model, it is hard to see how a lawyer's
choice of clients could be characterized as an act of political expression
on the part of the lawyer warranting the heightened protection offered
to the category of political associations. Perhaps if the client is engaged
in conduct that would clearly fall within the political realm, the
attorney's decision to represent that person could be considered to be an
act of political association.2 56 However, the professional model rejects
even that degree of identification of the lawyer with client objectives.
According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "[a] lawyer's
representation of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 257
Moreover, the notion of a political association based on the objectives
of the client will not suffice to place Nathanson's law practice into the
category of political associations. This is the case because it is seems
unlikely that many of Nathanson's divorce clients view themselves as
activists. 258 Such persons most likely seek out Nathanson's expertise
in order to emerge from their divorce proceedings in the best position
possible, both economically and with regard to family issues such as
child custody and visitation rights. Such persons might even be
compared to Arendt's homo faber, 259 whose associations fall within the
sociaVcommercial category of my reconstructed framework.
It is worth noting that the ethical foundations for the view of the
professional model that the attorney must subordinate his or her own
interests and represent vigorously all lawful client interests lie in notions

CENTERED APPROACH (1991), suggests techniques to help lawyers better to assist their
clients in identifying the goals and objectives of representation, without challenging the
fundamentally subordinate role of lawyers articulated by the professional model.
256. With regard to the representation of clients engaged in political activity, see
Symposium, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52
U. PITT. L. REV. 723 (1991). See also Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My Client>: The Role
Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1996).
257. MODEL RULES, supra note 251, at Rule l.2(b).
258. Professor Martha Minow questions this assertion, suggesting that many women
become politicized and committed to gender equality during the divorce process,
particularly those who are leaving abusive relationships and/or are facing dramatic
reductions in their standard of living following divorce. My contrary view is based on
my own experiences in other political lawyering contexts in which clients have either
failed to share or have affirmatively rejected their lawyers' broader political aims.
259. See supra notes 200-0 I, 206 and accompanying text.
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of individual "dignity, privacy and autonomy." 260 The argument along
these lines in favor of the subordination of attorney interests to client
interests has perhaps best been articulated by Professor Stephen
Pepper, 261 following up on Charles Fried's The Lawyer as Friend. 262
According to Pepper, individual autonomy is the primary value to be
served by our legal system. 263 Achievement of such autonomy
requires mastery of legal rules and institutions, which in tum requires
access to lawyers. 264 However, true first-class citizenship (maximum
autonomy) requires that clients' mastery of law be unfettered by an
attorney's views regarding morality or the political propriety of the
client's objectives. 265
For similar reasons, proponents of this view also believe that notions
of individual autonomy require that lawyers themselves have absolute
discretion to determine who they will represent as clients. 266 Indeed,
many see this as the flip-side of the requirement of a lawyer's unwavering loyalty to client objectives once the attorney has decided to represent
a particular client. 267 Thus, the view of the professional model has
long been:
[Al lawyer may refuse to represent a client for any reason at all-because the
client cannot pay the lawyer's demanded fee; because the client is not of the

260. Cahn. supra note 247, at 2497 n.98 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985)).
261. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper. Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise
in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities. 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986).
262. See Fried, supra note 228.
263. Pepper, supra note 261, at 616-17,
264. Id. at 617.
265. Id. at 618.
For a critique of Pepper's argument, see David Luban, The
Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637
(1986).
266. Fried, supra note 228, at I 078; Pepper, supra note 26 I, at 634.
267. It is somewhat surprising that writers across the spectrum of those who write
on matters of lawyering and professional responsibility seem to take for granted the
lawyer's unlimited discretion to choose clients (with the possible exception of the wellknown "last lawyer in town" hypothetical), despite likely disagreement with the
underlying notion advanced by Fried and Pepper of autonomy as the paramount value
to be served by our legal system. Compare Robert Gordon, Independence of Lawyers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988), with William H. Simon. Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1128 (1988), and David Wilkins. Race, Ethics and the First
Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1030, 1036 (1993). Wilkins does suggest, however, that a state might permissibly
disbar a white lawyer for refusing to represent African-Americans. Id. at 1039 n.51.
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lawyers' race or socioeconomic status; because the client is weird or not, tall
or short, thin or fat, moral or immoral. 268

This view is so firmly entrenched in mainstream legal consciousness
that a court reviewing Stropnicky's claim against Nathanson might
simply reject Stropnicky's claim on grounds of Nathanson's absolute
right to choose her clients, without even considering the Supreme
Court's framework for balancing freedom of association and equal access
claims. However, as David Luban points out, the notion that autonomy
in itself, regardless of the ends to which it is employed, ought to be the
fundamental value to be served by our legal system, is highly questionable. 269 In fact, encouragement of engagement in politics and the
equality principle that are the paramount values in the reconstructed
framework set forth in Part III, may be more important values to be
served by our legal system than abstract notions of autonomy (and may
actually serve individual autonomy in many cases). Thus, the professional model's embrace of absolute lawyer discretion in selecting clients
ought to be rejected. Of course, such a position still leaves open the
question of whether Nathanson's decision to refuse to represent
Stropnicky was an appropriate exercise of lawyer discretion in this
particular case.
b.

Protecting The Public Good

While certainly lesser in force and number than the prov1s1ons
discussed in the previous section asserting the primacy of client interests,
there are a number of provisions in the professional model's authoritative
texts that at least nominally require lawyers to abide the model's protect
the public good tenet as well as its primacy of client interests tenet. For
example, while lawyers are required by the Model Code to represent
their clients "zealously," 270 they must do so "within the bounds of the
law." 271 "The law," as set forth in this provision, may be seen as the
authoritative pronouncement of some conception of the public good. 272

268. Wolfram, supra note 248, § 10.2, at 53, quoted in Robert T. Begg, Revoking
the Lawyer's Right to Discriminate, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 278 (1993).
269. Luban, supra note 265, at 639.
270. See supra note 250.
271. MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at Canon 7, DR 7-102.
272. It is certainly questionable how much of a constraint this requirement to obey
the law places on attorney conduct. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers,

43

Lawyers are similarly required to "avoid the infliction of needless harm
[on third parties] .... " 273 There are, of course, also rules prohibiting
lawyers from offering false evidence,2 74 influencing the testimony of
non-party witnesses, 275 and rules requiring lawyers to treat persons
involved in the legal process with courtesy and concern.
The professional model's protect the public good tenet seems
particularly promising as an element in characterizing the practice of law
as a political association. This is because the reconstructed framework's
political association category is largely defined in terms of collective
efforts at determining the public good. However, despite the existence
of the above-quoted provisions, critics of the professional model have
long argued that it unduly subordinates its protect the public good tenet
to its primacy of client interests tenet. 276 Recent examples of lawyers
radically placing their clients' interests ahead of competing interests of
the legal system and third parties both support the views of such critics
and highlight the impotence of the professional model's existing
restraints on such conduct. 277
One often cited such example involves the role played by lawyers in
the savings and loan scandals of the 1980s. A number of prominent law
firms eventually agreed to the payment of millions of dollars to settle
claims against them arising out of their conduct on behalf of savings and
loan clients. 278 Critics have raised questions as to how lawyers, at

104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 472-74 (1990). For an argument that attorneys ought not be
bound by such a constraint under all circumstances, see William H. Simon, Should
Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 217 (1996).
273. Cahn, supra note 247. at 2497 (quoting DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 6).
274. MODEL CODE, supra note 250, at DR 7-102; MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 3.3.
275. MODEL CODE. supra note 250, at DR 7-109; MODEL RULES, supra note 251,
at Rule 3.4
276. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Who Are You to Tell Me That?: Attorney-Client
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Non-Clients, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 213 (1990) (arguing that traditional professional responsibility guidelines fail to
account adequately for the interests of third parties).
277. It is beyond the scope of this Article to try to determine whether such
examples of lawyers radically elevating their clients' interests over those of others are
driven solely by lawyers' own financial self-interests (in that lawyers may profit most
by maximizing client outcomes) as discussed in Part IV.B., or whether there are
independent causes for lawyers' willingness to engage in such behavior. Pearce
describes the informal control mechanisms in support of the professional model's protect
the public good tenet as the "Business Servant Taboo" -the notion that lawyers will not
maximize the well being of their business clients at the expense of others or the public
good. Pearce, supra note 234, at 1243. Pearce treats the Business Servant Taboo as a
subset of his "Profit Maximizer Taboo." See supra note 237.
278. Pearce, supra note 234, at 1254. See also In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics,
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least formally charged with protecting the public good, could have
participated in, failed to disclose, or actively covered up conduct that
they knew to be illegal and harmful to identifiable third parties. 279 The
answer, many believe, lies in a gross skewing between the professional
model's requirement that lawyers place their clients' interests first and
its protect the public good tenet In light of such examples, it is hard to
see how the professional model's protect the public good tenet, as it
currently stands, is adequate in itself to turn traditional attorney-client
relationships into political associations for purposes of Part III's
framework.
A number of critics of the professional model's failure to account
adequately for the public interest have proposed alternative conceptions
of lawyering and professional responsibility. The two most prominent
critics have been David Luban 280 and William Simon. 281 In a recent
article, Professor Paul Tremblay refers to the approach taken by Luban
and Simon as the "moral activist" model. 282 Pursuant to this alternative model, the lawyer must appeal to standards beyond those particular
to the role of the attorney in our legal system and those embodied in
officially promulgated codes of professional responsibility in order to
justify his or her professional conduct Professor Tremblay distinguishes
Luban's view, in which the attorney should be guided by "common
morality" in making professional decisions, 283 from Simon's view, in

and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (I 993).
279. See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F.Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C.
1990) (Sporkin, J.) ("Where were [the lawyers] when these clearly improper transactions
were being consummated'' Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves
from the transactions?").
280. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988);
David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections
to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424 ( 1990); David Luban, Partisanship,
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Partisanship].
281. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; Simon, supra note 267.
282. Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9 (1995).
Professor Cahn refers to the work of Luban and Simon as the "moral lawyering" critique
of the professional model. Cahn, supra note 247, at 2500-02.
283. Tremblay, supra note 282, at 20 & nn.53-54.
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which the attorney turns to conceptions of legal merit and justice as a
guide to conduct. 284
While both versions of the moral activist model serve to emphasize
consideration of the public good to a much greater degree than the
professional model, neither does so in a way that would transform
conventional attorney-client relationships into political associations for
purposes of Part Ill's framework. Under both Luban and Simon's
models, the attorney's appeal to the public good occurs largely in
opposition to, rather than in association with, the client. While lawyers
may engage in a "moral dialogue" with their clients regarding the
relationship of proposed courses of conduct to the public interest, 285
definition of the substantive objectives, purposes, and message of the
attorney/client association remain firmly the province of the client.
Should the client decline to follow the attorney's moral instructions, the
attorney is left as a solitary defender of her or his conception of the
public good. In such circumstances, the relationship simply cannot be
categorized as a political association for purposes of Part Ill's framework, despite the attorney's appeal to the public good.
2.

The Public Interest Lawyering Model Perspective

Regardless of whether one believes that the professional model
remains a viable conception of lawyering practice, or whether one agrees
with Pearce that it is being replaced by an emerging business model, 286
there has long been an alternative conception of lawyering in existence,
under which the balance between attorney, client, and public interests is
much more ambiguous than under the professional model, and under
which a lawyer's financial interests are plainly a secondary concern.
Within this alternative conception, the political and social change
objectives of an attorney-client association are paramount. None other
than Justice O'Connor embraced this conception in her concurring
opinion in Roberts. 281 Citing In Re Primus 288 and NAACP v. But-

284. Id. at 14, 20 n.59. Tremblay offers both a narrow reading of Simon (what he
refers to as Simon's "purposivist" perspective), in which the lawyer is guided by
determinations of legal merit in a narrow sense ("lawyers would choose those actions
which are best calculated to achieve the goals and intended purposes of the substantive
law established in generally applicable legal authority"), and a broad reading (which he
refers to as Simon's "justice-based" perspective), pursuant to which the lawyer acts
based on fundamental legal values and ideals. Id. at 26-27.
285. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 261, at 630; Luban, supra note 265, at 642;
Margulies, supra note 276.
286. See supra note 235.
287. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,631 (1984).
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ton, 289 Justice O'Connor noted that certain types of lawyering activities
fall within the scope of the First Amendment's heightened protection for
political associations. 290 In contrast, Justice O'Connor cited Ohralik
v, Ohio State Bar Association291 and Hishon, 292 and stated that "ordinary law practice for commercial ends has never been given special First
Amendment protection." 293
a,

Public Interest Lawyering s Past

The NAACP Legal Defense Fund's (LDF) campaign to eliminate
segregation in public schools, which was in issue in Button, 294 is the
quintessential example of public interest lawyering to achieve social
change in this country's history, 295 The NAACP lawyers engaged in
a long-term, carefully crafted attack on legalized segregation through the
vehicle of lawsuits in the courts. 296 After first struggling to force
compliance with Plessy v, Ferguson s297 mandate for equivalent quality
in separate educational facilities, the LDF lawyers mounted the direct
attack on Plessy that led to its reversal in Brown v, Board of Education, 298 Other examples of efforts to achieve broad political and social
288, 436 U.S. 412,412 (1978). In Primus, the Court struck down the action of the
state of South Carolina in disciplining an ACLU-affiliated attorney for writing a letter
to a potential litigant expressing the ACLU's willingness to represent her in a lawsuit
regarding the government coerced sterilization of female Medicaid recipients in Aiken,
South Carolina in the 1970s.
289. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the Court ruled that the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund's practice of soliciting potential litigants to challenge segregation in public
schools amounted to protected First Amendment activity.
290. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 637.
291. See supra note 243.
292. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
293. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 637.
294. See supra note 289.
295. For a recent reflection on the LDF' s campaign against segregation, see Peter
Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1139 (1995)
(arguing that a civic humanist account of tradition, as articulated in the writings of
Hannah Arendt, comes closer to the version of tradition embodied in the American Civil
Rights movement than the versions of tradition articulated by a "prudentialist" vision,
as exemplified in ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (I 993), or a "redemptive"
vision, as exemplified in MILNER BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993)).
296. Id. at 1174-75. See also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS
(J 994); RICHARD KLUGAR, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION (1987).
297. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
298. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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change objectives that involved lawyering activity include the welfare
rights movement, 299 the abortion rights campaign that led to the
decision in Roe v. Wade, 300 and the creation of the Office of Economic
Opportunity Legal Services Program and its successor, Legal Services
Corporation. 301

b.

Public Interest Lawyering in the Present

Despite their apparent successes, many of the achievements of these
legal campaigns have proven illusory or have been reversed in recent
decades. Even given Brown's landmark status, many urban school
systems remain highly segregated, 302 and Courts are increasingly
unwilling to require the extensive reforms that would be necessary to
achieve fully the promise of Brown. 303 Such judicial reticence has
similarly stymied other gains made by reformist political lawyers in the
1960s and 1970s in areas such as correctional 304 and other institutional
reform litigation. The welfare rights movement was relatively shortlived,305 and its legal advocates fell well short of their objective of
obtaining recognition of a constitutional right to a minimum level of
subsistence. 306 Recent years have witnessed a severe backlash against

299. See Ruth M. Buchanan, Context, Continuity and Difference in Poverty Law
Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1016-20 (1994). See also MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993).
300. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
301. See Buchanan, supra note 299, at 1014-16. For additional history regarding
the birth of the legal services program see Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal
Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529 (1995): Gary Bellow and Jeanne Charn, Paths
Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83
GEO. L.J. 1633 (1995).
302. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation,
Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 665 (1995); Richard Delgado
and Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of Education: Law
Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 547 (1995); Davison
M. Douglas, The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later: Introduction, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 337, 341 (1995).
303. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 5 I 5 U.S. 70 (1995) (refusing to endorse a variety
of remedial measures taken by school district on grounds that such measures went
beyond scope of original desegregation decree).
304. Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 639 (1993): Stephen Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115,
1118 (1994).
305. Buchanan, supra note 299, at 1019.
306. Id. See generally Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court /968 Term
Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 771 (1964).
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welfare rights and welfare recipients. 307 The Legal Services Corporation has barely survived elimination, 308 suffering deep funding reductions309 and draconian restrictions on the scope of its activities. 310
Aside from these "external"311 assaults on the possibilities for and
efficacy of public interest lawyering for social change, in the past decade
the work of lawyers advocating social change on behalf of poor people
has been subjected to searing criticism from the academic left. While
these developments suggest a critique of public interest lawyering on a
macro level, the academic left critique focuses more closely on particular
attorney-client relationships in the poverty lawyering setting. 312
Among other charges, writers of the "new poverty law scholarship"
contend that lawyers for poor people have traditionally suppressed the
oppositional narratives of their poor and oppressed clients in an effort to
fit their clients' stories to pre-existing narratives defined by the legal
system. 313 This failure to provide room for clients to speak results in
the lawyer becoming a further instrument of the client's oppression,
rather than a means for the client to fight such oppression. The critical
writers further suggest that public interest lawyers have failed to
appreciate the strengths, talents, and experiences of their poor clients,
and have failed to take advantage of the ways those attributes can further
the goals of legal representation. 314 The critique continues by contend-

307. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM (1995);
Larry Cata Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: "Ending Welfare as We Know It," 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1995).
308. Buchanan, supra note 299, at 1030.
309. Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients and Social Change,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415,418 n.12 (1996).
310. See Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
311. This term is borrowed from Trubek, supra note 309, at 415, though it is used
differently here.
312. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of' Progressive Lawyering: A Comment
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1099 (1994).
313. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructh-e Povertv Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of' Client Narrative, I 00 YALE L.J. 217 (199 l ); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the

Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. I (1990).
314. Gerald Lopez is a particularly strong proponent of this view. See Gerald P.
Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 ( 1989); GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LEGAL PRACTICE ( 1992); Gerald P. Lopez, An
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ing that public interest lawyers have failed to demonstrate sensitivity to
and strategies to combat racial, ethnic, gender, and class bias. 315
Finally, the critique contends that political lawyers have made inadequate
efforts to collectivize client experiences, i.e., to connect subordinated
persons together to share experiences, multiply strengths, and to provide
each other with support in facing similar challenges. 316
Interestingly, when viewed broadly, at least one strand of this critique
seems to present an extreme version of the professional model's primacy
of client interests tenet317 located in the poverty law setting. Professor
Ruth Buchanan, in her excellent discussion of the new poverty law
scholarship, identifies strong and weak versions of this strand as the
"lawyer-as-translator" and the "lawyer-as-shadow" models. 318 Both
versions share a deep ambivalence toward lawyers' efforts to speak on
behalf of their poor clients as "necessarily reenact[ing) the subordination
that their clients experience in the world, for the purpose of overcoming
it." 319 Moreover, both see the life experiences of poor clients and their
lawyers as so radically different that there is a "communication gap" that
makes it extremely difficult for lawyers to represent (or re-present)
accurately their poor clients' stories. 320
Nonetheless, proponents of the lawyer-as-translator321 model suggest
that "[t]hrough empathy, ethnography, and experience, the poverty
lawyer-as-translator is able to act as a reasonably effective go-between
on behalf of his clients." 322 On the other hand, proponents of the
lawyer-as-shadow model are much less sanguine about the capacity of
lawyers to represent poor clients without performing "interpretive

Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REY. 315 (1996).
315. See, e.g.. White, supra note 313; Lopez, supra note 314, at 1629.
316. See Anthony V. Alfieri. Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 622 (199 l ); Lucie E. White. Mobilization on the Margins
of a Lawsuit. 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535. 546 (1988).
317. See supra Part lY.C.1.a.
318. Buchanan, supra note 299, at 1038.
319. Id. /citing Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for
the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990)).
320. Id. at 1039.
321. The lawyer-as-translator model is most closely identified with the writings of
Clark Cunningham. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Clark D. Cunningham, The

Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992). See also Christopher P. Gilkerson,
Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory 4 Receiving and Translating
Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992). Buchanan also relies on the work of
Gerald Lopez to suggest the viability of the lawyer-as-translator model.

supra note 299. at 1039-40 (citing Lopez, supra note 314).
322. Buchanan, supra note 299, at I 038.
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violence" regarding the meaning of the clients' experiences. 323
According to Buchanan, proponents of this view believe the gap between
lawyer and client to be unbridgeable, and that only clients can formulate
and represent their own interests. 324 What follows is a view of the
appropriate lawyer role "as a shadow figure, ensuring from the sidelines
that the client's voice is heard." 325 What seems clear is that even more
than was the case under the professional model's primacy of client
interests tenet, under both the lawyer-as-translator and the lawyer-asshadow models, the lawyer's role is far too restricted for the lawyer's
choice to associate with particular clients to be considered to be an act
of political association for purposes of Part Ill's framework.
Of course, the critique presented by the new poverty law scholars has
not gone without reply. Some have argued that at its most extreme, the
academic left critique romanticizes the capacity of poor people to
transform their social worlds, while at the same time ignoring the
potential of lawyers to contribute to achieving an alternative vision of
society. 326 The reply suggests that the new poverty law scholars'
critique "essentializes" poor clients to be representatives of subordinated
groups. 327 Furthermore, the critique denies both the fact that the shortterm interests of such clients may conflict with the long-term interests
of the groups to which they belong 328 and the valuable role that
lawyers can play in helping to evaluate and resolve such conflicts. 329
The new poverty law scholars' critique has further been challenged for
lacking a normative vision that can lead to social transformation to a
more democratic and egalitarian society. 330

323. Id. at 1039, citing Alfieri, supra note 313.
324. Id. at 1041.
325. Id. at I 038.
326. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 312; Paul R. Tremblay. Rebellious Lawyering,
Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Lael Bureaucracr. 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (l 992).
327. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
328. Tremblay, supra note 326.
329. William Simon refers to the fact that performance in such a role is inevitably
influenced by the lawyer's own values as the "Dark Secret" of progressive lawyering.
See Simon, supra note 312, at I I 02.
330. Joel F. Handler, Postnwderni.,·m. Protest, and the New Social Movements. 26
L. & Soc'y REV. 697 (1992).
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c.

Public Interest Lawyering •s Future?

Despite the eloquence of the response to the new poverty law scholars'
critique, many of the charges raised by the critique seem indisputable.
That fact, combined with the previously-described external assault on
public interest lawyering, raises the question of whether there is anything
left of the somewhat romanticized notion of public interest lawyering
presented by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Roberts. 331
Certainly, a pessimistic view of public interest lawyering' s future could
lead to withdrawal and despair. 332 However, to the optimist, what
emerges from the internal and external challenges described above are
possibilities for a successful, albeit modified, version of public interest
lawyering for the future. While the potential for successful, long-term,
broadly-conceived impact litigation campaigns such as the NAACP's
attack on legalized segregation seems remote, 333 more targeted and
strategic "test cases" or lawsuits aimed at structural reform retain the
potential to be an important part of an overall social reform strategy. 334
Moreover, when the constructive aspects of the critique of poverty
Iawyering 335 are taken together with the recognition of certain enduring
strengths of the "old-style" of public interest lawyering that is presented
by the response to the new poverty law scholars' critique, 336 what
emerges is a new understanding of public interest lawyering: lawyers
form "alliances" with clients, 337 based "in forms of respect and mutual-

See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner"s Reflections on Political
Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 306 (1996).
331.
332.

333. Ironically, perhaps the closest approximation to the LDF model in existence
today may be the campaign currently being waged in the courts by conservative public
interest law groups to end affirmative action. See Adam Cohen, The Next Great Battle

Over Affir11U1tive Action: A Lawsuit Against the University of Michigan Could End
Racial Preferences in College Admissions, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 52.
334. See Buchanan, supra note 299, at 1022; Martha Minow, Political Lawyering:
An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287, 291 (1996).
335. Buchanan and Trubek have distilled five "constructive" principles from the
new poverty law scholarship that might form the basis for a newly conceived form of
public interest lawyering. These are: (]) to humanize poor clients; (2) to politicize legal
practice; (3) to collaborate with clients; (4) to strategize with clients as to proper
approaches to achieving objectives; and (5) to organize among persons with similar
issues. See Ruth Buchanan & Louise Trubek, Resistance and Possibilities: A Critical
and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
687,691 (1991).
336. See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
337. The term "alliances" is taken from Gary Bellow, supra note 332, at 303, and
corresponds roughly to Gerald Lopez's vision of "Rebellious Lawyering." See Lopez,
supra note 314. See also Richard B. Marsico, Working for Social Change and
Preserving Client Autonomy: ls There a Role for Facilitative Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL
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ity," 338 that take advantage of the strengths, weaknesses, and particular
capacities of lawyers, clients, and lay advocates in order to achieve
political ends. The prospect of large numbers of such small-scale
alliances directed toward positive social change, ideally coordinated and
collectivized in some coherent (but flexible) fashion, holds out perhaps
the best hope for a model of public interest lawyering for the future.
3.

Nathanson s Law Practice as a Political Association

Though perhaps not self-consciously, Nathanson's practice of
representing women only in divorce proceedings for purposes of
combating gender bias in the court system and in society at large, fits
the above-described prototype of what public interest lawyering must
become if it is to thrive in the future. 339 While the professional
model's primacy of client interests tenet and the new poverty law
scholar's focus on client autonomy may suggest that the attorney's role
in an individual case is too narrow to create a political association, 340
Nathanson's overall practice of aggregating such cases in a manner that
challenges the courts and society to live up to their rhetoric of fairness
without regard to gender amounts to precisely the type of appeal to the
public good that defined Part III's political realm.
Therefore,
Nathanson's decision only to represent women in divorce proceedings
ought to be considered an act of political association for present
purposes, and ought to be accorded the heightened deference provided
to political associations within the above-described framework.

V.

BALANCING STROPNICKY'S EQUALITY CLAIM AGAINST
NATHANSON'S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION CLAIM

The task remains to balance Stropnicky's equality claim against
Nathanson's freedom of association claim in light of the forgoing

L. REV. 639 (I 995).
338. Bellow, supra note 332, at 303.
339. See Trubek, supra note 309, at 428 (describing private "social justice law firm"
engaged in family law practice as an emerging form of successful political law practice).
340. William Simon points out that the critical literature on poverty lawyering has
had relatively little to say about the question of client selection. See Simon, supra note
3 I 2, at 1104. But see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 8 I GEO. L.J. 2567
(1993) (arguing that poverty lawyers cannot coherently answer the question of whether
to accept a particular case until they establish an overall "theoretics of practice.")
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conclusion that Nathanson's law practice amounts to a political
association entitled heightened protection within Part Ill's framework.
The Supreme Court's framework 341 would subject the Massachusetts
public accommodation law to heightened scrutiny for its prima facie
infringement upon Nathanson's freedom of association right. 342 Given
the history of the Supreme Court's applications of such heightened
scrutiny, 343 one may assume that the Court would strike down the
M.C.A.D.'s application of the Massachusetts law. However, recall that
in Roberts, despite finding the Jaycees to be an expressive association
entitled to heightened constitutional protection, the Court nonetheless
upheld the application of Minnesota's public accommodations law to the
Jaycees. 344 Finding the State's interest in fostering equality to be
compelling, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority stated:
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the
Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and
personal harms . . . . [D]iscrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces
individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship
to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual
dignity and denies societt the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic and cultural life: 45

Thus, the Court went on to favor the excluded women's quest for equal
access over the Jaycee members' asserted associational rights. One
might conclude, therefore, that Supreme Court might actually favor
Stropnicky's claim to equal access over Nathanson's claim of freedom
of association despite the application of heightened scrutiny.
The likelihood of such a result is strengthened by the fact that the
current Supreme Court's doctrine regarding equality claims embraces the
"neutral" or "color-blind" approach taken by Stropnicky. Pursuant to
such an approach, the equality-based claims of white males such as
Stropnicky are treated as being equivalent to such claims as advanced by
women and members of minority groups. This is the case despite the

341. See supra Part III.A.
342. For reasons discussed above, it is far from certain that a reviewing court would
even reach this point in the analysis. First, such a court might simply rely on the
traditional view that a lawyer has absolute discretion to chose his or her clients, and rule
in favor of Nathanson without even applying the Supreme Court's framework. See supra
notes 267-69 and accompanying text. Alternatively, even if it applied the Supreme
Court's framework for balancing freedom of association and equal access claims, a
reviewing court might be unwilling to embrace a conception of political lawyering that
goes beyond the traditional public interest lawyering model articulated in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts. See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 214.
344. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
345. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (I 984) (citations omitted).
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fact that as a group, white males have been thoroughly dominant
throughout American history, and persons such as Stropnicky have
presumedly enjoyed the advantages that correspond to that status
throughout their lives. By contrast, women and members of minority
groups have been subordinated throughout American history, and have
not generally enjoyed such advantages. 346
For example, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in cases brought by
white plaintiffs claiming that efforts to assist members of historically
disadvantaged groups through contracting preferences 347 and electoral
districting 348 amount to "reverse discrimination." Though the Court
has traditionally distinguished racial from gender classifications, 349 it
has shown a willingness to equate the gender discrimination claims
raised by men with those raised by women in a manner that is similar
to its willingness to accord equivalent treatment to racial discrimination
claims raised by both Caucasians and African-Americans. 350 These
trends, combined with the Court's holding in Roberts, suggest that if
Stropnicky's claim were ever to reach the Supreme Court, the Court
might well conclude that Stropnicky's equality claim should outweigh
Nathanson's freedom of association claim, despite Stropnicky's lack of
membership in a historically disadvantaged group. Thus, the Court
might indeed uphold the M.C.A.D.'s decision to sanction Nathanson.
However, in "reconstructing" the Supreme Court's framework, it is not
necessary to include the same conception of equality as has been
embraced by the Court. I join the many commentators who have
rejected the Court's so-called "neutral" approach to evaluating equalitybased claims similarly regardless of whether raised by members of

346. See. e.g., Ward, supra note 46 (rejecting the commensurability of Stropnicky's
claims of equal access with similar claims advanced by African-Americans and women).
347. See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to federal highway program providing contracting preferences to members of
historically disadvantaged groups); Croson v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to Richmond's contracting set-aside program).
348. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny to
legislative redistricting plan that provided for three "majority minority" districts); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same).
349. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, I 16 S.Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996).
350. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (accepting
challenge by male to nursing school's policy of admitting only women); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that use of preemptory strikes to exclude males
from a jury violates the equal protection clause).
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historically advantaged or disadvantaged groups. 351
The Court's
approach fails because it does not account for the lingering effects of
historic discrimination that continue to manifest themselves today and
which will not be eradicated without further actions being taken. Such
an inattention to context and to the practical effects of legal rules is a
form of blindness that causes the Court's doctrine to yield unacceptable
results. 352 From this perspective, Stropnicky's equality claim should
be viewed as being extremely weak, and likely inadequate within our
reconstructed framework to trump Nathanson's freedom of political
association claim, as articulated in the previous Part of this Article.
It is worth noting that Nathanson's practice of representing women
only in divorce cases may be seen as an example of what has traditionally been considered to be the primary alternative to the "neutral"
approach to equality claims employed by the Supreme Court. This
alternative may be referred to as the "affirmative-action" or "benign
discrimination" approach, and is also exemplified by the "set-aside"
program rejected by the Court in Adarand v. Pena. 353 Under the
"benign discrimination" approach, classifications that favor members of
groups that have historically been discriminated against are permissible,
whereas classifications based on race or gender that further disadvantage
members of such groups are not. 354 From such a perspective, an
application of Massachusetts' public accommodation law that would
permit Nathanson to restrict the provision of her services to members of
a historically disadvantaged group, women, would not be viewed as
inappropriate. Alternatively, Stropnicky's claim of "reverse discrimination" based on his membership in a historically advantaged group would
not be credited. It should be reiterated, however, that this approach has
not been accepted by the current Supreme Court.

35 I. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1060 (1991); Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Seances and Color-Blind Ghosts,
72 N.C. L. REV. 401 (1994); Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextua/ Illusion of a Color-Blind
Constitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1994) (reviewing Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind
Constitution); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1991 ); Kenneth Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility:
Patterson in Context, 1989 SUP. Cr. REV. l; PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 98- 130 (I 99 I).
352. See Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 851
(I 990) (advocating attention to context).
353. See supra note 347.
354. Examples of cases upholding the affirmative-action approach include Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding certain preferences afforded
to minority-owned firms in applying for broadcast licenses), overruled by Adarand
Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (upholding set-aside program for contracts on local public works projects).
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Not surprisingly, the "benign discrimination" approach has received
much criticism from the proponents of so-called "color-blindness" or
"neutrality,"355
However, such classification schemes have also
recently been subjected to criticisms from many who remain convinced
of the lingering existence and effects of racial, gender, and other
invidious forms of discrimination, and the critical importance of
eradicating the vestiges of such discrimination, For example, in a recent
article, 356 Professor Martha Minow presents criticisms of "identity
politics," 357 which may apply to the "benign" classificatory schemes
described above as well as to Nathanson' s practice of restricting her
representation to women in divorce cases, 358 Professor Minow points
out that among other troubling aspects, identity politics "essentializes"
individuals by "reducing a complex person to one trait-the trait drawing
that person into membership in a particular group-and then equating
that trait with a particular viewpoint and stereotype," 359 Perhaps
Nathanson has been guilty of "essentializing" both Stropnicky and the
women that she represents,
If this is the case, then Nathanson can be said to have demonstrated
a lack of judgment in her refusal to represent Stropnicky, in the sense
that Hannah Arendt might have used the term, To Arendt, to exercise
judgment meant for one to think in the place of others, to take their
perspectives into consideration, 360 The exercise of judgment in this

355. See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (rejecting
the application of lower level scrutiny to "benign" racial classifications).
356. Martha Minow, Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics and Law, 75 OR. L.
REV. 647 (1996). For a more detailed version of Professor Minow's article, see
MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE LAW (1997).
357. Professor Minow defines identity politics as "the mobilization around gender,

racial, and similar group-based categories in order to shape or alter the exercise of power
to benefit group members." Minow, supra note 356, at 648.
358. Indeed, in her Foreword to the Western New England Law Review's
Symposium on Stropnicky v. Nathanson, Professor Minow criticizes Nathanson's refusal
to represent Stropnicky. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and
Doing the Right Thing, 20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1998).
359. Minow, supra note 356, at 653. Minow further criticizes identity politics for
failing to account for "intersectionality" between group identities, for example, the fact
that a person may be both an African-American and a woman at the same time. Id. at
655.
Additionally, Minow points out that the definitions of group membership
themselves, which form the basis for identity politics, are unstable and incoherent. Id.
at 657.
360.

HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 22] (1961).
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sense was the quintessential political activity for Arendt. 361 Considering the diverse perspectives of others is both a prelude to, and indeed an
instance of, the kind of debate and persuasion that characterize Arendt's
public sphere. 362 Of course, the need to "woo the consent" of others
in this way is a function of the plurality that characterizes Arendt's
public realm. 363
For Arendt, judgment is a "mode of thinking particulars which does
not subsume particulars under general rules but ascends 'from the
particular to the universal.'" 364 Perhaps if Nathanson had looked at
Stropnicky's situation in all of its particularity, she would have viewed
his request for representation in terms of his position, 365 that of a
"displaced homemaker," 366 rather than in terms of the general category
of "male," within which she seems to have placed his situation. Indeed,
Nathanson herself may have been guilty of the kind of stereotyped
reliance on existing gender roles that Justice Brennan criticized in his
opinion in Roberts. 367 Thus, a failure of judgment may have caused
Nathanson to select an incorrect means (representing only women) to her
laudable end of eradicating gender inequality. Perhaps a positional
analysis, focusing on Stropnicky's situation as a subordinated homemaker, would have caused Nathanson to choose a different means (representing Stropnicky) to achieve her desired end.
Then again, perhaps not. Arendt's concept of judgment does not
require one to accept the point of view of the other, but only to consider
it genuinely. 368 Nathanson did have an opportunity to speak with
Stropnicky before she declined to take on his case, and he did inform
her at that time of the particularities of his situation. 369 Thus,
Nathanson may well have considered Stropnicky's situation in all of its
particularity, and may nonetheless have rejected the notion that his
request for representation presented a positional, rather than a gender

361. See Richard J. Bernstein, Judging-the Actor and the Spectator, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 221, 229 (1986) [hereinafter "Judging"]; Seyla Benhabib, Judgment and
the Moral Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt's Thought, in SITUATING THE SELF
121, 141 (1992).
362. Bernstein, Judging, supra note 361, at 230.
363. Id. at 230-31; Benhabib, supra note 361, at 137.
364. Bernstein, Judging, supra note 361, at 229. Arendt's derivation of this
conception of political judgment from Kant's treatment of aesthetic judgments, "which
are normally believed to be furthest removed from politics," is highly controversial. Id.
at 228-29.
365. Bartlett, supra note 352, at 880.
366. See supra note 20.
367. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
368. Benhabib, supra note 361, at 137: accord Bartlett, supra note 352, at 883.
369. See supra Part II.
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issue. 370 Perhaps Nathanson's experience in the Massachusetts courts
suggested to her that even Stropnicky's displaced homemaker argument
was likely to be more favorably received because he is a man than the
same argument would be if made on behalf of a woman. Indeed, there
is ample evidence to support the notion that gender, in itself, remains a
prevalent ground of invidious discrimination within the Massachusetts
courts. 371 Alternatively, Nathanson may simply have determined that
the cause of gender equality would be better served by allocating the
scarce resource that her practice represents to those who are most
directly impacted by gender bias.
If the "true facts" support these latter two scenarios, then Nathanson's
refusal to represent Stropnicky ought not be viewed as an ill-advised
example of identity politics. In offering a series of "social strategies" to
address the "historic and continuing practices of group exclusions and
oppressions" that identity politics attempts to respond to, while
remaining cognizant of the potential harms that may result from identity
politics, Martha Minow includes the need for "intensive and aggressive
enforcement" with regard to the anti-discrimination principle. 372 This
is despite the potentially divisive nature of such actions. As Minow puts
it, "challenges to the hypocrisy-the gap between our ideals of equality
and freedom and the reality-offer the best hope for pulling this country

370. Indeed, Stropnicky's own rhetoric in his MCAD complaint is more suggestive
of a reverse discrimination type argument than a positional argument. See supra Part
II.

See, e.g., REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
(1989).
372. Minow, supra note 356, at 676. The other strategies offered by Minow are:
(1) to facilitate public compensation and reparations for past and continuing group-based
harms; (2) to frame a variety of settings for eliciting facts and narratives of past and
continuing group-based harms; (3) to devise governmental policies that permit
individuals to affiliate or identify themselves with groups temporarily and for specific
purposes rather than rely on governmental assignment to fixed groups; (4) for
prospective governmental action rather than efforts to remedy or comprehend past group
harms, to try achieving governmental purposes without deploying group-based categories
while remaining committed to overturning the effects of categorical exclusions in social
and political realms; and (5) public support for art and artistic opportunities to address
topics of past and present identities and affiliations, oppressions and resistances, and
individual freedom. Id. at 679-96. Minow deliberately adopts strategies that are to some
degree in conflict with one another so as to facilitate the process of jointly dealing with
issues of historic discrimination and the rigidity of group assignments. Id. at 676.
371.

COURT

59

together." 373 Perhaps Nathanson's practice of representing women
only in divorce cases presents just such a challenge.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to evaluate the competing claims of freedom of
association and equality presented in the case of Stropnicky v.
Nathanson, in terms of a modified version of the Supreme Court's
doctrinal framework for addressing such competing claims. The
Supreme Court's framework has been modified in accordance with
philosopher Hannah Arendt's conception of the three spheres of human
activity, and the critique that has been made of Arendt's writings in this
regard. The modified framework attempts to capture Arendt's celebration of politics because of the centrality of political activity to fundamental constitutional values, as well as the intrinsic value of political activity
to human development and the fact that politics is the only means to
achieving public justice.
As such, the modified framework recognizes and supports the political
nature of the challenge to the status quo around gender issues presented
by attorney Nathanson's law practice. More particularly, the framework
treats Nathanson's modified version of public interest lawyering as a
form of political association entitled to heightened constitutional
protection. Despite this fact, given the similar importance of the
antidiscrimination principle in American law, the modified framework
requires that serious consideration be given to Stropnicky's equality
claim as well.
To the extent that Stropnicky's equality claim presents an argument in
favor of so-called "neutral" application of antidiscrimination law, it is
rejected within the modified framework. However, to the extent that
representation of Stropnicky's position would in fact be serving of the
kind of plurality that Arendt argued was necessary to a thriving public
realm, then perhaps Stropnicky's claim should be viewed as outweighing
Nathanson's. Unfortunately, the factual context within which the dispute
between Stropnicky and Nathanson arises remains sufficiently ambiguous
so as to prevent a definitive conclusion as to whose position would
better advance the cause of plurality. While such a conclusion may
seem unsatisfying, it suggests that at a minimum, in the absence of
factual evidence to the contrary, it would be wrong to uphold the
sanctioning of Nathanson for what was at worst an error of judgment in
her otherwise laudable entry into politics in pursuit of plurality.

373.

60

Id. at 679.

